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ABSTRACT 
The following work is an examination of the 1981 Uprising in Kosovo, a watershed 
moment in the history of Yugoslavia. The story of this event will be detailed in the following 
pages through a narrative history of the uprising and the incidents that surrounded it. Along with 
the historical description, the uprising will be analyzed within the framework of Rogers 
Brubaker’s theory on nation as form, category, and event and through his triadic relational nexus. 
Using this view of the nation as a shell within which the discourse of the events took place, 
articles from Albania’s Zëri i popullit and Yugoslavia’s Borba will be analyzed using Ruth 
Wodak’s negative out-group qualities from her discourse-historical approach and Tae-Sop Lim’s 
and John Bower’s analytical framework for facework. Through these methods, a more robust and 
variegated understanding of the 1981 Kosovar Uprising, its place in the dissolution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the growing destabilization of the region in the 
1990s can be reached.     
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GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CK SK Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista  
Central Committee of the League of Communists 
 
KPJ  Komunistička partija Jugoslavije 
  Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1919-1952) 
 
PKSh  Partia Komuniste e Shqipërisë 
  Communist Party of Albania (1941-1948) 
 
PPSh  Partia e Punës e Shqipërisë 
  Party of Labour of Albania (1948-1991) 
 
RPSSh  Republika Popullore Socialiste e Shqipërisë 
People's Socialist Republic of Albania 
 
SAP Kosovo Socijalistička Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo 
Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo 
 
SFRJ  Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
SKJ  Savez Komunista Jugoslavije  
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1952-1990) 
 
SR Srbija Socijalistička Republika Srbija 
Socialist Republic of Serbia 
 
UÇK  Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës 
Kosovo Liberation Army 
 
UDB  Uprava Državne Bezbednosti 
State Security Administration 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The following work is an examination of the 1981 Uprising in Kosovo, then an 
autonomous province of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and nominally attached to 
the Socialist Republic of Serbia. 1981 represented a watershed moment in the history of 
Yugoslavia. The uprising in Kosovo showed the first significant cracks in the foundation of the 
state, which would eventually lead to its dissolution in the 1990s, following the death of its 
longtime leader, Josip Broz Tito. Significant reforms in the 1960s and 70s resulted in the 
devolution of power from the central government to the republics and provinces. These reforms 
were designed to satisfy local and ethno-national interests while maintaining the “brotherhood 
and unity” of Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities and the supremacy of the League of 
Communists. Despite a significant level of self rule and ethnic Albanians populating  
government ranks, economic disparities and a continued feeling of inferiority pushed the 
Albanians of Kosovo to take part in a series of demonstrations that rocked the state and changed 
the trajectory of Kosovo’s development within the Yugoslav system. 
The demonstrations and riots in 1981 also marked the end of over a decade of positive 
relations between one-time bitter adversaries, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and the 
SFRJ. Internal and external environmental changes had brought the two states to a reconciliation 
of sorts. Relations began to improve for the first time since 1948 following the Prague Spring 
and continued with Kosovo acting as a bridge between the two countries throughout the 1970s. 
Though never able to come to terms ideologically, Albania and Yugoslavia had found a path to 
associate with each other amicably through mutually beneficial avenues. The events in Kosovo 
in 1981 and the treatment of the province’s predominantly Albanian population drove a wedge 
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between the two states that would see the end of their cooperation in Kosovo and a dramatic 
reduction in their economic relationship.  
The story of this watershed event will be detailed in the following pages through a 
narrative history of the uprising and the events that surrounded it. Along with the historical 
description, the uprising will be analyzed within the framework of Rogers Brubaker’s theory on 
nation as form, category, and event and through his triadic relational nexus. Using this view of 
the nation as a shell within which the discourse of the events took place, articles from Albania’s 
Zëri i popullit and Yugoslavia’s Borba will be analyzed using Ruth Wodak’s negative out-group 
qualities from her discourse-historical approach and Tae-Sop Lim’s and John Bower’s analytical 
framework for facework. Through these methods a more robust and variegated understanding of 
the 1981 Kosovar Uprising and its place in the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the growing destabilization of the region can be reached.     
1.1. Historical Background 
 
The territory of Kosovo has served as a bone of contention in the Balkans during much of 
its recent history. The kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro during the early 1900s sought union 
with Kosovo, the seat of the medieval Serbian Empire, and possession of Kosovo Polje, site of 
the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Acquisition of the then Ottoman province was laid down 
as a major reason for the formation of the Balkan Alliance and initiating hostilities against the 
Ottoman Empire leading to the Balkan Wars from 1912-1913. Kosovo was captured in late 1912 
by Serbian and Montenegrin armies and partitioned between them, from which Serbia received 
the lion’s share of the territory. Serbia and Montenegro began concerted efforts to colonize the 
territory and encouraged Kosovo’s non-Serb population to emigrate.1 This process was stalled,                                                         
1 John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (1996; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 94-96. 
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however, when Kosovo was lost to Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary less than three years later 
during the First World War.  
During the Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian occupations, circumstances changed 
drastically for the Albanian population of the territory. Austria-Hungary occupied the northern 
half of Kosovo and was greeted by the local Albanian population as liberators. Communiqués 
with the War Ministry in Vienna reported that Albanians had joined the fighting against Serb 
troops in the Kosovar towns of Mitrovica and Peć and celebrated the Austro-Hungarian victory 
against the Serbian army on December 2, 1915.2 Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities 
installed Albanians into local government positions, permitted the use of the Albanian tongue in 
official discourse, encouraged the creation of Albanian-language schools, and promoted 
Albanian cultural and educational development.3 Austria-Hungary, following its occupation of 
portions of northern and central Albania during the war, even considered unifying their occupied 
sections of Albania with Kosovo in the future.4  
Bulgaria’s occupation zone was quite different. The population was forced into 
compulsory labor service and faced famine conditions in 1916 and 1917, due to the extensive 
requisitioning of foodstuffs by the Bulgarian military.5 Kaçak bands, Albanian guerrilla forces, 
were formed and fought against the Bulgarian occupation authorities with some success.6 
Ultimately, though, it was the internal dissolution of the Central Powers, war weariness, and a 
renewed offensive by Serbian, French, and British troops in the Macedonian Campaign that led 
to the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian occupiers, buttressed by German forces. 
                                                        
2 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a Short History (New York: NYU Press, 1998), 260. 
3 Ibid., 261. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 262. 
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They were evicted from Serbia’s pre-war territories two weeks before the armistice that ended 
the First World War was signed on November 11, 1918.  
Kosovo’s recapture in 1918 saw it reabsorbed into Serbia and Montenegro as part of the 
newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Albanians attempted to fight back. 
Kaçak raiders fought against government troops throughout the Albanian-populated areas of the 
state and were supplied with arms by leading members of the government of Albania.7 Aid from 
Albania was sporadic and never official, though, as Belgrade continuously intervened in the 
country’s politics and prevented Tirana from backing their co-nationals across the border in a 
stronger fashion.8 In fact, according to Ivo Banac, it was not Yugoslav forces that effectively 
ended the kaçak’s actions in the mid-1920s, but it was instead Ahmet Bej Zogu who as premier 
of Albania, sponsored by Belgrade, assumed leadership in Tirana and pursued a “self-contained 
policy” that disarmed the kaçak’s supply line in the northern highlands of Albania and eliminated 
their influential supporters in Tirana.9 
During the interwar period, Kosovo was splintered into, at first, four counties—three 
attached to Serbia and one to Montenegro—and then, after the institution of the Royalist 
Dictatorship, three distinct Banates. Also in this period, the Yugoslav government encouraged 
the assimilation or emigration of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo territory. Albanians in the 
Kingdom were forced to add Serbian suffixes to their names and were required to conduct 
official business in the Serbo-Croatian tongue.10 Estimates of Albanian emigration from 
Yugoslavia during the interwar period differ wildly, from as low as 35,000 to as high as 
                                                        
7 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Paperbacks, 
1988), 302-303. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 305 
10 Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 
1999), 285. 
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500,000.11 In place of the departed Albanians arrived Serb and Montenegrin colonists from 
Montenegro, Hercegovina, and Lika, who took up residence on the lands they vacated.12 
Researchers estimate that as many as 600,000 Slavs colonized the territories of Kosovo during 
the Royalist period.13  
The Axis invaded on April 6, 1941, bringing the Second World War to The Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia.  Under Axis rule, the state was dismantled. Kosovo was carved into three sections. 
The Mitrovica region was placed under the Nazi occupation authority, due to the importance of 
the Trepca mines, along with the districts of Lab, Vucitrn, and Dezevo.14 Eastern districts of 
Gnjilane, Kacanik, and Vitin were allotted to Bulgaria.15 The largest portion of Kosovo, though, 
along with the towns of Debar, Tetovo, Gostivar, and Struga were attached to the Italian-
sponsored Greater Albania.16  
For many Kosovar Albanians, the Axis were seen as liberators. A largely unified 
Albanian state had been created, the Albanian language was put into use in schools and as the 
language of local administration, and it was permissible to fly the Albanian national flag across 
Greater Albania.17 Albanians and their Italian sponsors encouraged the emigration of thousands 
of Slavs from the territory of Greater Albania, with estimates varying greatly—much as the 
emigration of Albanians during the Royalist period had—from 10,000 to as many as 100,000.18 
In their place, the Italians promoted a settlement program that saw 72,000 Albanians from the 
                                                        
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: a History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia Univ Pr, 1998), 121. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 122. 
18 Mertus, Kosovo, 287. 
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territories of the pre-war Albanian state being resettled within the confines of the newly attached 
Kosovar territories.19 
Despite their eventual victory over the Axis powers occupying Yugoslavia, the KPJ faced 
significant obstacles in encouraging popular resistance to the occupation from Slavs and 
Albanians within the territories of Kosovo. Albanians were uneasy regarding the future of 
Albanian-inhabited lands in a post-conflict Yugoslav socialist state. KPJ activists like Fadil 
Hoxha20 attempted to assuage their fears by emphasizing the likelihood of unification with 
Albania, under KPJ auspices, should socialism prove victorious in Albania, as well as in 
Yugoslavia.21 Despite these veiled assurances, Kosovar Albanians failed to join the Partisans in 
any appreciable number.22 For Kosovar Serbs that remained to fight in Kosovo, the majority 
linked up with the Chetniks led by Colonel Draža Mihailović.23  
The 1944 Partisan victory over the Axis liberated Yugoslavia. Consolidating power in the 
newly liberated territories proved difficult, however, particularly in Kosovo. While led to believe 
that the KPJ would allow Kosovo to join with Albania, which had also enjoyed a Partisan victory 
against the Axis, the reality was that the territory would once again become an appendage of 
Serbia.24 Tito believed that to separate Kosovo from Serbia would damn a communist victory 
                                                        
19 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 123. 
20 Hoxha was later a member of the collective presidency of the SFRJ during the 1981 Uprising. 
21 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 136-137. 
22 According to Philip Cohen, by late 1944 troops from Kosovo numbered an estimated 20,000 of the roughly 
648,000-strong Partisan force, while never exceeding 6% of the total force (late 1941). See: Philip J. Cohen, Serbia's 
Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 96. 
Radošin Rajević estimated that as many as 15,000 Kosovar Albanians were members of the National Liberation 
Army at the close of the war of a total of roughly 800,000 total members. See: Radošin Rajević, “Emergence and 
Development of the Autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia and Yugoslavia,” in Relationship between Yugoslavia and 
Albania, ed. Ranko Petković (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost, 1984), 54.   
23 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 122. 
24 Mertus, Kosovo, 287. 
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amongst the Serbs.25 This decision by the KPJ was a significant factor in the Kosovo Uprising 
from 1944-1945. 
The Kosovo Uprising at the close of the Second World War set the stage for two decades 
of poor relations between Kosovar Albanians and the KPJ (later the SKJ beginning in 1952). The 
conflagration erupted when word reached the Partisan National Liberation Army base in 
Podujevo, Kosovo of a massacre that had occurred in the town of Drenica26 west of Prishtina.27 
Troops from the 7th Brigade, which was populated by Kosovar Albanians from the Drenica 
region, stationed in Podujevo were dispatched as a commission to investigate the allegations and 
report back.28 When the commission arrived in the town, they found the bodies of an estimated 
250 men, many of which had been hacked to death by axes, in the Klina River.29 The 
commission then presented their findings to the Staff of the Yugoslav detachments of the 
National Liberation Army in Kosovo.30 In response to the report, Yugoslav detachment troops 
executed the commission members, which led to an eruption in hostilities between KPJ troops 
and Kosovar Albanians in the Drenica region lasting for six months.31 The rebel fighters were 
brutally suppressed and the Albanian population paid a heavy price with an estimated 48,000 
killed during the uprising.32 
Consolidating power in Kosovo was also aided by the lack of interference from Albania. 
Though often characterized as a “Stalinist” regime or later as “Maoist,” the Albania that emerged 
from the Second World War under the leadership of Enver Hoxha and the Partia Komuniste e 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 
26 Drenica later was the scene of massacres in 1998 and 1999 
27 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 142. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 143. 
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Shqipërisë (PKSh) was founded and developed early on along the Yugoslav model.33 The KPJ 
helped to organize and arm the national liberation movement in Albania and served as its 
sponsor with the Allied camp. Pro-Yugoslav factions were firmly entrenched in the PKSh until 
the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948, at which time Hoxha purged them from the ranks and consolidated 
his own powerbase.34 Following the war, though, Albania was clearly a satellite state of 
Yugoslavia, firmly tied to its neighbor economically, militarily, and politically.35 As it relates to 
Kosovo, Partisans from Albania played a role in the liberation of the territory from Nazi control, 
as support troops for Yugoslav Partisan forces. Bernd Fischer equated this to an accurate belief 
by Tito that the Partisans would face far less opposition with an Albanian presence involved in 
the takeover.36   
Ultimately, though, Enver Hoxha’s attitude toward Kosovo during the war and in the 
post-war era is difficult to discern. Hoxha was believed to have been opposed to unification with 
Kosovo due to Gheg dominance within the territory.37 Hoxha and the vast majority of the PKSh 
were Tosk from southern Albania. By adding the Gheg population of Kosovo to those in 
northern Albania, an overwhelmingly Gheg-dominated state would emerge, which could have 
proved to be an unfavorable environment for PKSh-Tosk hegemony. Hoxha, though, did sign an 
agreement in 1943 with representatives of Balli Kombëtar that supported the retention of an 
ethnic-based Greater Albania following the war, which would include Kosovo.38 Hoxha was later 
forced to renounce the agreement by the Yugoslavs.39 While it is not clear what Hoxha’s true 
                                                        
33 For a discussion of the development of the communist movement in Albania see: Bernd Fischer, Albania at War, 
1939-45 (London: Hurst & Company Publishers Ltd., 1999). 
34 Ibid., 253. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 240. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Bernd Fischer, "Enver Hoxha and the Stalinist Dictatorship in Albania," in Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and 
Authoritarian Rulers of Southeast Europe (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007), 246. 
39 Ibid. 
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feelings were vis-à-vis Kosovo, what is clear is that the RPSSh before 1981 rarely took a 
hardline stance regarding treatment of their co-nationals in Yugoslavia, and instead saved the 
majority of their post-1948 vitriol for ideological quarrels.    
The Kosovo that emerged from the ravages of the Second World War faced very similar 
circumstances to the one that emerged from the First World War. Vasa Čubrilović—a member of 
the group that plotted the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 and later an 
influential figure amongst the KPJ and a member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts—
advocated for the mass expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo. In an address to the KPJ 
leadership, which included Tito, Milovan Djilas, and Aleksander Ranković, Čubrilović 
expounded on the need to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians as a way to secure a direct ethnic border 
between Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia linked by a strategically vital and ethno-nationally 
favorable Kosovo-Metohija.40 Čubrilović found an eager listener to his ideas in UDB chief and 
future vice president of Yugoslavia, Aleksander Ranković.41 
Due to the Tito-Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, 
Yugoslavia’s close relationship with Albania came to an end. This turn of events added another 
level of suspicion toward Yugoslavia’s Albanian population, who were already viewed as 
potentially pro-fascist and now had their loyalty to the regime questioned due to ethnic ties with 
the neighboring RPSSh. To combat this potential danger, Belgrade pursued a policy of 
“Turkification” to weaken the national consciousness of the state’s Albanian population.42 
Albanians were to be educated in Turkish and were encouraged to emigrate to the Republic of 
                                                        
40 Klejda Mulaj, "A Recurrent Tragedy: Ethnic Cleansing as a Tool of State Building in the Yugoslav Multinational 
Setting," Nationalities Papers 34, no. 1 (2006): 34. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Turkey.43 By 1966, more than 230,000 Albanians had been forced to leave Yugoslavia, most of 
them fled to Turkey.44 
Ranković was part of Tito’s inner circle, headed the Yugoslav secret police, and led the 
assimilationist-conservative wing of the KPJ/SKJ.45 In Kosovo, he encouraged a Serb-centralist 
policy, due to his deep distrust of non-Serbs, one that was predicated on surveillance and Serb 
dominance of the Kosovar politico-security apparatus.46 His methods of repression, though, 
began to come to light in the 1960s. He was accused of pursuing policies and practices that were 
antithetical to Yugoslav constitutional law, and that his pursuit of Serbian hegemony in the 
region had encouraged the growth of Greater Albanian separatism and nationalism.47  
Ranković’s opposition to Edvard Kardelj’s push for reform through devolution led him 
to, allegedly, orchestrate an attempt on Kardelj’s life in 1959. Along with Kardelj and the liberal 
wing of the party, Ranković had drawn the ire of many through his use of intimidation and 
surveillance. Matters reached a head in 1966 when the liberal bloc persuaded Tito that Ranković 
and his cronies needed to be removed. In a session of the Brioni Plenum, Tito accused Ranković 
“of deviating from party policy as early as 1964 and of forming a political clique with the 
objective of taking power.”48 Ranković and several of his compatriots were expelled from the 
party and stripped of their posts, opening the door for the rise of the liberal wing and the 
development of workers’ self management. Within a few years the status of Kosovo and its 
Albanian population within the Yugoslav Federation was drastically changed from one of Serb 
domination to a period of Albanian ascendancy.                                                           
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana Univ Pr, 
1992), 84. 
46 Ibid., 188. 
47 Ibid., 189. 
48 Ibid., 90-91 
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Following the fall of Aleksander Ranković in 1966 and the subsequent demonstrations in 
Kosovo in 1968, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began a decade-long period of 
compromise and the devolution of power to its ethnic-Albanian population in the province of 
Kosovo. In addition to the improvement in relations between the Yugoslav government and its 
ethnic-Albanian populace, bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and neighboring Albania 
reached their most cordial level since prior to the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. The 1970s can very 
well be described as a time of considerable advancement for the Albanians of Kosovo and a 
period of collaboration between the RPSSh and the SFRJ. 
Patrick Artisien ascribed this spirit of cooperation and renewed interest in the formation 
of a Balkan Pact by Tirana and Belgrade to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and 
their mutual interest in preserving their own independence in a time of growing external pressure 
in the region.49 What aided in maintaining this spirit, however, was the atmosphere of 
cooperation being fostered in Kosovo and the improvement in the status of the Albanian 
population of the province. Albania and Yugoslavia’s relationship deepened, as a result, leading 
to educational and cultural exchanges, trade agreements, the opening of cross-border travel 
between the province and the RPSSh, and the re-appointment of ambassadors in Belgrade and 
Tirana. This did not lead to ideological agreement, though, as both states continued to criticize 
each other’s political programs, although this was not a serious impediment to increasingly 
beneficial ties between the two countries.50  
Despite positive developments in Kosovo and growing cultural, educational, and 
economic cooperation between Albania and Yugoslavia, all was not well.  Josip Broz Tito’s 
health had deteriorated during the late 1970s, leading to his death in May 1980.  With the death                                                         
49 Patrick Artisien, "Yugoslavia and Albania in the 1970s," Co-Existence: An International Journal 15, no. 2 (1978): 
219. 
50 Ibid., 222-225. 
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of Yugoslavia’s great wartime and post-war leader, the state now lacked the unifying figure that 
had maintained a level of cohesion between its disparate republics and provinces and nations and 
nationalities.  Economically, the SFRJ stood on the edge of the precipice, which set the stage for 
the tragic events that followed in Kosovo in 1981.         
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CHAPTER 2: THE UPRISING  
 
2.1. Prelude 
 
The first two decades of communist rule in Yugoslavia saw the Albanian minority of 
Kosovo—and in other regions of the Federation—facing many of the same issues that had been 
present in the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
The province was still linked to Serbia, as was Vojvodina. The period from 1949-1965 was 
termed the era of “Serb Domination” by Petrović and Stefanović, as a time when Kosovar 
Albanians faced institutional domination by Serbs who were overrepresented in Kosovo in the 
state sector, the SKJ, and the UDB.51 Furthermore, Serbs possessed higher rates of employment 
in the industrial sector of the economy.52 Albanians confronted symbolic domination in 
Yugoslavia, as well, through their categorization as a “nationality,” or minority group, within a 
state dominated by its “nations” and through the widespread official usage of Serbo-Croatian as 
the de facto language of the state.53 The labeling of Albanian irredentism as the “Greatest 
Danger” confronting the Province also marked the period of Serb domination, as well as the 
encouraged outmigration of Kosovar Albanians to Turkey.54 The institutional and symbolic 
domination of Kosovo’s Albanians by the Serb minority was justified politically and 
ideologically through Kosovar Serb overrepresentation in the wartime Partisan forces.55          
Slavs populated most government positions, dominated the province’s security forces, 
and Albanians faced persecution and suspicion related to their position as a national minority in 
Yugoslavia with a neighboring national homeland in the RPSSh that, after 1948, was hostile to                                                         
51 Aleksander Petrović and Đorđe Stefanović, "Kosovo, 1944-1981: The Rise and Fall of a Communist 'Nested 
Homeland'," Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 7 (2010): 1078. 
52  Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, 
Lessons Learned (New York: Oxford Univ Pr, 2000), 35. 
53 Petrović and Stefanović, "Kosovo, 1944-1981," 1078 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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the SFRJ. This fact was highlighted by a show trial in Prizren in 1956 where leading Albanian 
communists were accused of being part of a spy network infiltrating Kosovo from Enver 
Hoxha’s Albania, which led to them being imprisoned for lengthy sentences.56  These issues, 
along with underdevelopment and a lack of public investment in the province, relative to the rest 
of the Yugoslav Federation,57 left Kosovo languishing behind the rest of the SFRJ, while 
condemning the province’s majority-Albanian population to the status of second-class citizens.  
However, during the latter half of the 1960s, the Albanians of Yugoslavia were greeted 
with two significant events, which changed their status within the state. First, the Brioni Plenum 
in 1966 led to the ouster of UDB head and previously trusted lieutenant of Tito, Aleksander 
Ranković. Ranković’s security apparatus had been responsible for much of the institutionalized 
repression of Albanians in Kosovo and had been accused of pursuing centralist and hegemonistic 
policies favoring Serbs and Montenegrins in the province.58 The fall of Ranković signified a 
“second liberation” for many Kosovar Albanians and, as was reported by Radio Free Europe, 
“gave the green light to an urgent and stormy development toward full Albanian self-government 
in Kosovo.”59 In the ensuing two years, Albanians established themselves in numbers across 
every sector of public life in Kosovo.60 Kosovar Albanians became such a numerically strong 
segment of the public sector that by 1968 Serbian officials in Kosovo began to feel the effects of 
discrimination pointed their way.61  
                                                        
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Louis Zanga, “Belgrade Position Vis-à-vis Albanians Hardened [Country Series: Albania],” 07 February 1969, 
[Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:2-7-182, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: 
http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=47304 [accessed 14 March 2013], 2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 3. 
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Seen as another significant conciliatory gesture, Tito made his first visit to Kosovo in 
sixteen years in March 1967. He offered pointed criticism regarding conditions in the province: 
“[o]ne cannot talk about equal rights…when Serbs are given preference in the factories…and 
Albanians are rejected although they have the same or better qualifications.”62 An additional 
attempt at appeasement by federal authorities was the elimination of the Serbo-Croatian term 
“Šiptar,” a variation of the Albanian word “Shqiptar,” which means “Albanian,” as the official 
term used by the SFRJ to denote an individual of Albanian origin.63 The word had taken on a 
derogatory connotation and was replaced by the term “Albanac.”64 Of note also was the decision 
in September 1968 to permit “the free use of Albanian national symbols such as flags,” but with 
the warning to nationalist elements “that misuse of this right would be strongly disapproved.”65 
While the elimination of Ranković’s repressive security apparatus and other subsequent 
measures represented significant victories for the Albanian population of the province, for many 
Kosovars the reforms did not go far enough. Albanians within the SKJ coalesced into two 
factions concerning the substance and scope of the reform program in Kosovo-Metohija. The 
hardliners, who later became associated with the University of Prishtina, pushed for Albanians to 
be immediately elevated to the status of a “nation” within the SFRJ and called for the 
establishment of an Albanian national republic that would have complete equality with the other 
republican, national units of the state.66 The second group, termed the “gradualists,” were 
supporters of the reform program proposed by Aslan Fazlija, the future president of the Central 
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Committee of the SK Prishtina during the 1981 Uprising.  The gradualists supported a program 
that called for Kosovo to remain an appendage of the SR Srbija, but with far greater autonomy 
than previously existed.  Essentially, Fazlija’s plan called for Kosovo to remain “a Serbian 
province in form, but an Albanian ethnic republic in content.”67 Fazlija drafted a report in 1967 
that articulated the means to achieve the gradualists’ goal for Kosovo. In the report he outlined 
the need to eliminate the differences between the status of the state’s nations and nationalities.68 
This would be achieved by allowing the direct representation of nationalities on all three levels 
(federal, republican, and provincial) of the state and by changing the Yugoslav Chamber of 
Nations to the ‘Chamber of Nations and Nationalities.’69 He argued that representation of 
nationalities would reinforce the SKJ’s decision to pursue decentralization.70 While calling for 
significant change to the status quo, Fazlija and the gradualists proposed and supported a path 
that would essentially elevate the provinces to the status of republics and nationalities to the 
status of nations, but without altering the vocabulary associated or modifying the territorial limits 
of the existing federal system of provinces and republics to carve out an Albanian Republic 
within the SFRJ.  At the close of 1968, the plan proposed by Fazlija and the gradualists would be 
adopted by the SKJ and forever change the constitutional structure of the SFRJ, but supporters of 
the hardline approach to reform would have their day first. 
The most provocative attempt to force the state to create an Albanian national republic 
and eliminate the second-class status of the nationalities within the Federation by Kosovar 
Albanians was the protests and riots that occurred in October and November of 1968. In October, 
reports emerged detailing incidences of anti-Serbian protests in the Kosovar cities of Peć, 
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Prizren, and the town of Suva Reka in the district of Prizren.71 Participants numbered in the 
hundreds and Yugoslav authorities blamed the incidences on RPSSh intelligence services 
fomenting discord in the province.72  
Though small in number, these “anti-socialist” demonstrations were taken seriously by 
Yugoslav authorities with Tito himself calling a meeting with provincial leaders.73 Tito had 
shown increasing interest in the status of the Province, in general, meeting with the Kosovar 
leadership again on the 24th of October.74 Discussions of the social, economic, and political 
issues were allegedly “presented to Tito in a very frank, open and objective manner, as [Tito] had 
requested,” according to Ismail Bajra, a member of the six-member Kosmet75 delegation.76 Tito 
urged the quick implementation of measures focused on reversing Kosovo’s decades-long 
economic problems, while also offering his complete support in the adoption of constitutional 
changes that would grant Kosovo-Metohija greater autonomy.77 
Despite the positive momentum being generated toward monumental reforms in the 
Province’s status, tensions increased and the region exploded in chaos on November 27th, only 
days before the November 29th celebrations of Albanian Independence Day, Kosovar Liberation 
Day, and the anniversary of the proclamation of the Yugoslav federal state, all of which landed 
on the same day.  Hundreds of demonstrators destroyed property in Prishtina, while the rioting 
spread across the Province, and by December to the Albanian-dominated cities of Gostivar and 
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Tetovo in neighboring Macedonia.78 Demonstrators allegedly could even be heard chanting, 
“Long live Enver Hoxha!”79 Leaders of the protest in Prishtina drew up a list of demands that 
called for the removal of the word “Metohija” from the Province’s name, the designation of 
Kosovo as a republic within the SFRJ, the extension to Kosovo of the right of self-determination, 
and the establishment of a university.80 In all, 37 people were injured in the demonstrations in 
Prishtina—13 of which were police officers—and one person died.81 
 According to Julie Mertus, Tirana maintained a largely silent stance regarding the 
plight of its co-nationals across the border during the 1968 protests, a striking contrast to the 
vociferous response to similar circumstances in 1981.82 To underscore this, in early November 
1968 an editorial in Zëri i popullit strongly criticized Yugoslavia ideologically—something that 
happened with relative frequency throughout the Cold War—but made no mention to problems 
in Kosovo, nor criticized Yugoslav treatment of the Albanian minority in the state.83 They did 
however specifically mention a firm commitment to “non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries, respect for the independence and national sovereignty of the peoples and non-
violation of their territorial integrity.”84 Although, this likely had more to do with maintaining a 
stable relationship with Yugoslavia in the wake of the upheaval in the Communist Bloc created 
by the Prague Spring than condoning the SFRJ’s actions in Kosovo.  
 This is not to say, however, that Tirana was completely silent regarding the situation in 
Kosovo and the issues facing Albanians across the Yugoslav Federation. In a Zëri i popullit                                                         
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editorial preceding the outbreak of violence in late November, the RPSSh responded to the post-
Brioni status of developments in Kosovo-Metohija for the first time.85 Tirana criticized 
Yugoslavia for implementing only token gestures of expanded rights, such as the new law 
allowing the display of the Albanian national flag.86  Emphasized was the need for more wide-
reaching measures that would lift “the general state of oppression and national discrimination” 
experienced by Albanians in Yugoslavia, which Radio Free Europe implied meant that the 
RPSSh was calling for republican status for Kosmet.87 Radio Free Europe also questioned the 
timing of the editorial’s release, implying that Tirana may have expected demonstrations to erupt 
close to the time of publishing, as evidenced by the following quote: 
“We tell the present-day leaders of Kosovo to be more realistic, to study more 
deeply the glorious history of the Albanian population of Kosovo which has never 
bowed before oppression, however brutal and merciless it may have been. If they 
do this, it will become obvious to them that every repressive and discriminating 
measure and any persecution which they may undertake with regard to the 
population of Kosovo will bring to them only new, successive and all-out 
defeat.”88 
 
While the 1968 protests resulted in the imprisonment of the demonstration’s leadership 
for periods of up to seven years and the purging of 37 members of the SKJ,89 it did lead to the 
second major milestone in the late-1960s transition of Kosovo: the revision of the 1963 Yugoslav 
Constitution in 1968.90 Under new amendments, adopted from Fazlija’s gradualist program, 
judicial and legislative authority devolved from Belgrade to the Provinces (Kosovo-Metohija and 
Vojvodina), and both units were given representation in the federal parliament—a privilege that                                                         
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had been previously granted only to the republics.91 Of particular importance to the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija) was the removal of 
the name “Metohija,” a Serb-geographic designation looked at as a symbol of Serbian 
colonization, from the Province’s official title and the addition of the term “Socialist,” thus 
rechristening the Province as the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (Socijalistička 
Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo).92 Kosovo and Vojvodina were also granted the right to establish 
their own constitutions separate from Serbia, giving them political autonomy from the SR Srbija, 
while Kosovo was also given priority over the other regions of the state in the disbursement of 
central funds for internal development.93 These two events signaled the end of Kosovo as merely 
an appendage of Serbia, a state that had existed almost without interruption since the conclusion 
of the Balkan Wars from 1912-1913, and ushered in a period of rapid social, cultural, 
educational, and economic change in the newly renamed Socialist Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo.  
Following the era of Serb domination, an era of Albanian domination over Kosovo was 
ushered in after the 1968 riots, stretching to the 1981 Uprising.  Kosovar Albanians dominated 
the institutions of the state in the Province, holding overwhelming majorities in state security, the 
SKJ, and the state sector.94 Symbolic domination by Albanians was highlighted by the promotion 
of Albanian to the status of de facto official language of the SAP, as well as the Albanian flag 
taking position below the SFRJ banner as the official symbol of Kosovo.95 The ideological 
justifications for the emergence and maintenance of Albanian ethnic domination over the 
Province stemmed from the vast numerical majority Albanians held in the SAP Kosovo and from                                                         
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the “Greatest Danger” that was now posed by Great Serbian Nationalism.96 The emergence of an 
Albanian-dominated Kosovo also caused an outmigration of Serbs and Montenegrins to areas 
deemed “safe” for their people in other areas of the SFRJ.97 
Its cultural institutions further defined the new Albanian-dominated Kosovo, the prime 
symbol of this being the University of Prishtina.98 Established in 1969, the University of 
Prishtina was the first institution of higher learning in Yugoslavia to offer Albanian as an official 
language of instruction. Although the RPSSh and the SFRJ never appeared able to come to terms 
regarding ideological differences, the post-1968 adjustments to Kosovo’s status, the push for 
stabilization and development in the Province, and the establishment of the University of 
Prishtina ushered in a period of fruitful relations between Albanian and Yugoslavia.  
Marko Nikezić, newly elected Chairman of the SK Srbija, supported the pursuit of 
normalization of relations with Albania as a means to create a more stable atmosphere for 
Kosovo’s development already in December 1968.99 To that end, trade increased 77% from 1968 
to 1969, with a further increase projected for 1970.100 Also of note was the expansion of tourism 
between the two states.101 The major breakthrough, though, was in the educational realm. 
Announced on November 19, 1969, coinciding with the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the 
liberation of Prishtina and the official announcement of the creation of the University of 
Prishtina, was the signing of a contract with the RPSSh to provide textbooks and educational                                                         
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materials for the new university.102 The University of Tirana also signed a contract with Prishtina 
to provide more than 200 teachers to set up Albanian-language courses during the first five years 
of the new university’s development.103 University of Tirana faculty and cultural groups also 
became a regular presence as collaborators and advisors at the University of Prishtina during the 
course of the 1970s, as the SAP Kosovo took advantage of new rights encapsulated in the 1974 
Constitution that allowed it to engage in contact and negotiate agreements with “organs and 
organizations” of foreign countries.104 
By the pivotal year of 1981, 36,000 full-time students were enrolled at the university, and 
an additional 18,000 were enrolled in extension programs.105 The university had been built to 
accommodate only about 12,000 students.106 The authorities had allowed the university’s student 
population to grow unchecked as a temporary means to alleviate chronic unemployment, 
rationalizing “that it was better to have the youth in the classroom than roaming the streets.”107 
Kosovo had a ratio of 274.7 students per 1,000 inhabitants, which outpaced the national average 
by almost 80 students per inhabitant.108 Overcrowding, poor facilities, and lack of future 
employment opportunities made the student body of the University of Prishtina ripe for extremist 
activity. It was out of this situation that a canteen at the university served as host to the first 
action of the 1981 Kosovar Uprising.   
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2.2. The Death of Tito 
 
Josip Broz Tito died on May 4, 1980, following more than 36 years as the leader of 
Socialist Yugoslavia. Tito led the Yugoslav Partisan resistance to victory over the Axis Powers 
in the Second World War. He served at varying times as the President of Yugoslavia, Prime 
Minister of Yugoslavia, Federal Secretary of the People’s Defense, Secretary-General of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, and Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. He 
survived defying Stalin in 1948. In addition and most notably, he was the principal architect of 
the post-World War II Yugoslav state, deftly reinventing himself and the state as circumstances 
changed. Socialist Yugoslavia transitioned through four constitutions under his leadership, while 
Tito morphed from soldier to celebrity statesman. However, while change did occur, the one 
constant was the unifying personage of Josip Broz, whether clad in military regalia or a suit and 
dark sunglasses. 
With Tito’s death, Yugoslavia entered a period of mourning. Although the population had 
been prepared for the Marshall’s passing by regular medical bulletins describing his declining 
health, grief and shock gripped the country. A pivotal soccer match between Belgrade’s Crvena 
Zastava and Zagreb’s Dinamo was immediately suspended upon announcement of Tito’s 
passing; players exited the field with tears in their eyes. The people of Yugoslavia gathered in 
massive crowds to pay their respects as Tito’s body crisscrossed the country via train. 
Ultimately, nearly half the population visited the gravesite in Belgrade. Representatives from 122 
states attended the funeral; of the major world powers, only the United States failed to send its 
head of state to attend the somber event.109  
Less than a year after the death of Tito, on March 11, 1981, the federation that he 
spearheaded began a dissolution that would lead to a series of bloody wars that eventually                                                         
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divided Yugoslavia into seven independent states, states that were once joined in “brotherhood 
and unity.” Yugoslavia under Tito had been able to weather storms before 1981. Uprisings had 
been put down successfully in the past by the regime;110 however, the 1981 Kosovar Uprising 
came at a time of extreme economic distress that lacked the unifying figure of Tito.      
2.3. The Uprising 
 
The Yugoslav wire service, Tanjug, reported on March 12, 1981, that a small 
demonstration had taken place the night before at the university in the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo. The report stated that this “violation of public order and peace” had 
occurred as “individual enemy elements tried to draw on the discontent of students with meals at 
the student canteen.” The account went on to state that after the intervention of students and the 
university’s instructional staff, “the [remaining activists] scattered and departed to their homes.” 
It was claimed that students, workers, the university, and the local populace “condemned” the 
incident, and that work at the university had returned to a state of normalcy.111  
Noel Malcolm identifies an incident at a university-eating hall as the catalyst for the first 
demonstration. While eating lunch, a student found a cockroach in his soup. After hurling his 
food tray to the floor in disgust, he was joined by other students present in voicing their 
displeasure with the conditions at the university. The unrest moved outside of the main 
administrative building, and a crowd quickly grew to roughly 500 individuals. Police were called 
in and began making arrests, which further enraged the protesting students. The number of 
protestors continued to expand with the ending of a nearby soccer match: the city center filled 
with spectators who began joining the demonstration en masse. Malcolm puts the number of 
demonstrators at this point at between 3,000 and 4,000. The protestors, emboldened by their                                                         
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numbers, became more overt in their criticism of the authorities. Police again attempted to 
disband the demonstrators, but the crowd had turned violent and began hurling rocks at police. 
Rioting continued through the night of the 11th, and order was not restored until police used tear 
gas to disperse the crowd on the morning of the 12th.112 
At the time, Aslan Fazlija, president of the Presidium of the SK Prishtina, had a far 
different interpretation of the events that unfolded on March 11th. He stated that “speculations are 
transparently malicious…in some reports from foreign countries that allege the existence of a 
large number of participants, injuries, and detainees in the demonstrations from March 11th” and 
further elaborated “that not one of the students on that day was injured or detained.”113 Fazlija 
did not discuss the actions of police or the breadth of the demonstration. 
Although likely initially driven by student discontent with university facilities, the main 
impetus behind the expansion of the first protest actions in Prishtina was rumored to be 
economic in nature: high cost of living and the economic benefits afforded to government 
bureaucrats.114 The economic realities were likely augmented by the national issue, which Louis 
Zanga labeled as “a real aspect of the Kosovar dilemma.”115 Factors affecting the national issue 
were described as follows: Kosovo’s relaltive poverty compared to the rest of Yugoslavia, 
compounded by high population growth; the history of oppression of the Albanian majority in 
Kosovo; and it’s proximity to Albania.116 As the protest movement gathered momentum in the 
following weeks, all signs pointed to these elements being significant factors in the Uprising.  
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Immediately following the events of March 11th, discussion of the episode in the 
Yugoslav press was muted. Borba presented a brief account produced by the Tanjug wire service 
on page 5 of its issue from the 13th of March.117 More of note, though, was Rilindja’s118 account 
of the event. According to Radio Free Europe, the same Tanjug account was buried on page six 
of the daily, though the newspaper was typically not shy about generating their own reports of 
similar matters in other regions of the state.119 The provincial committee also met as scheduled 
the day after the protest, seemingly with the air of business-as-usual, only belied by the presence 
of Fadil Hoxha120 and the grim countenance of the political leaders in attendance.121 This 
outward reaction to the disturbances of March 11th likely point to an attempt by the Yugoslav 
leadership to minimize the actual scale of the protest, which the foreign press presented as very 
significant.  
A new round of demonstrations ensued on the 25th of March, as protests erupted in the 
southern Kosovo town of Prizren. The very next day, University of Prishtina students occupied 
residence halls. Sources stated that the protestors demanded that Kosovo be given the status of a 
republic and continued calls for improvements in facilities and conditions at the university. 23 
students and 12 policemen were injured, and 21 students were detained after police stormed the 
residence halls and used tear gas to end the student occupation.122  
Protest actions continued on the 1st and 2nd of April, with the Prishtina students being 
joined by striking workers from Pudjevo. Protestors, allegedly in the thousands, stormed through 
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the center of the city, destroying factory equipment and breaking shop windows.123 According to 
Artisien and Howells (1981), at this point, “[t]he disturbances thus took on overt symptoms of 
Albanian nationalism and irredentism, in the form of slogans and demands for the elevation of 
Kosovo to the constitutional status of a republic and, in some extreme cases, for the unification 
of the Albanian population of Yugoslavia with neighboring Albania.”124 
On the 2nd of April, Yugoslav authorities imposed emergency measures to suppress the 
demonstration movement.125 These measures banned all public gatherings and mobile groups 
across the province.126 Army units were posted to protect public buildings. This strong reaction 
by the government was in response to the actions of what official numbers pegged at around 
10,000 protestors who marched through Prishtina on April 1.127 Police attempted to disperse the 
crowd with tear gas, and according to sources of The Washington Post, several hundred people 
were injured in the melee.128 Of note were the accusations that some of the protestors were 
armed with guns and had used children as human shields in the face of security forces.129 
Reports also pointed to incidents occurring in at least a half dozen towns across the 
province over the preceding three weeks.130 This included in the city of Peć, home of the Serbian 
Orthodox Patriarchate, which was reported to have been heavily damaged by fire on March 
16th.131 This proved untrue, as it was actually the convent of the Sisters at Peć that was damaged, 
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a relatively new building located a good distance from the Patriarchate.132 Albanian protestors 
were originally accused of starting the blaze, but a court investigation concluded that an 
electrical issue caused the fire.133 Despite the findings that arson was not the cause, Serbian 
public opinion had been formed during the earlier reports, and they were enraged by the 
perceived lack of action by authorities against the alleged Albanian perpetrators.134  
The next day, both The Washington Post and The New York Times reported that the 
Yugoslav government had dispatched tanks and troops to Prishtina.135 There they were to take up 
positions in the Kosovar capital and put down any further incidences of public dissent by the 
populace.136 The Interior Ministry also augmented the emergency measures enacted on April 2nd 
by imposing an 8:00 pm to 5:00 am curfew in Prishtina and four other towns in the province.137 
On April 4th, troop levels were increased further with the arrival of extra militia from 
Belgrade.138 Yugoslav authorities denied that troops had been sent to Kosovo and dismissed 
rumors that two individuals had been killed during clashes with security forces on April 1st and 
2nd.139      
While claiming that life had begun to return to its pre-uprising state in Kosovo on April 
5th, Yugoslav officials advised the population on evening state television that “things are not yet 
normal” and warned the population to be mindful of “the enemy.”140 Further evidence of a lack 
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of a return to normalcy was the cancelation of a soccer match in Prishtina.141 Authorities also 
nixed appearances by two ethnic Albanian teams in matches outside of Kosovo.142  
By April 6th, the Yugoslav authorities began to admit the obvious. Stane Dolanc, a senior 
official in the Party Presidium and a member of the Federal Council for Protection of the 
Constitutional Order, made it known to the world that authorities had been caught off guard by 
the uprising.143 He acknowledged that thousands had taken part in the demonstrations, but that 
actual activists only numbered around 200, and that incidents had occurred in Kosovar towns 
outside of Prishtina.144 The perpetrators were labeled as “pro-fascist” groups that were operating 
out of Albanian-expatriate communities across Europe, noting those in Brussels and Stuttgart in 
particular.145 Dolanc confirmed that military units had been dispatched to Kosovo, emphasizing 
that they were present solely to guard critical installations, not to take place in putting down the 
riots.146 He did not rule out their potential use in the future if the situation deteriorated once 
again.147 Also of note was his report that 11 individuals had perished during the course of the 
riots (including two police officers), 57 had been wounded148, and that 22 protestors were 
currently in custody.149 Several more were arrested at the time, but had since been released.150  
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On the night of April 8th, the curfew in Prishtina was lifted.151 The following week, 
officials relaxed the state of emergency and reopened grade schools in the province.152 
Journalists were allowed to visit the province on “official tours” on the 18th and 19th of April (for 
the first time since April 2nd), and the University of Prishtina reopened on April 20th.153 Although 
normality had returned to an extent, a ban on public gatherings still remained in force, and a 
heavy army and police presence continued in the province.154   
Other towns affected by the demonstrations included Istok, Obilić, Podujevo, Leposlavić, 
Vučiturn, Vitana, Glogovac, Mitrovica, and Uroševac.155 Incidents took place outside of Kosovo, 
as well. Members of the Albanian minority in the Montenegrin capital of Titograd vandalized 
shop windows.156 Anti-Yugoslav pamphleteering and sloganeering cropped up in the cities of 
Tetovo and Ohrid in Macedonia.157 Albanian nationalists were also accused of making trouble in 
the southern towns of Bujanovac, Presevo, and Medvedja in the SR Srbija.158 Tensions were 
even felt as far away as Zagreb and Ljubljana, where police halted an Albanian demonstration at 
the last minute.159 
Two weeks after the demonstrations of April 1st and 2nd, Mahmut Bakali, leader of 
Kosovo’s Communist Party, announced that 28 people would be tried for inciting the riots.160 
Bakali himself was forced to resign on May 5th, after an official report “accused the province’s 
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leaders of responsibility for the separatist riots.”161 The exodus of officials continued as student 
center managers were dismissed in the Kosovar capital.162 Local officials in nearby Obilić were 
also dismissed from their posts as a result of the demonstrations in their town.163 
After the incidents in early April, mass demonstrations ceased in Prishtina. Small-scale 
actions, though, were still occurring. An account from Radio Free Europe described a disturbing 
incident that took place on the night of April 29th.164 According to the report, vandals in the 
Serbian-populated village of Bresje, in the Prishtina commune, damaged 19 graves and dug up a 
17 others.165 While emphasizing that no suspects had been identified, Radio Free Europe noted 
that incidents like this had reportedly never occurred in the village previously, and that “[t]here 
have never been complaints regarding the cohabitation with Albanians and members of other 
ethnic groups who live in this village and nearby villages, and even today they do not doubt that 
this act is the work of someone else and of hostile elements who reject this cohabitation.”166  
Kosovo Party Presidium member Ali Sukrija also stated that further “hostile activity” was 
still taking place, including distributing leaflets and efforts to encourage further 
demonstrations.167 These efforts led to a small demonstration, despite the ban on public 
gatherings still in force, in the second full week of May, which garnered very little press 
attention.168 A much larger demonstration occurred on May 18th. Around 1,000 students at the 
university gathered in front of a dormitory building, calling for an improvement in conditions at                                                         
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the university and, according to Tanjug, “demanded that the province become a republic and 
unite with neighboring Albania.”169 Yugoslav security forces allegedly did not engage the 
protestors, and the students eventually dispersed on their own accord.170 The students reconvened 
on the morning of the 19th at the campus student center, but no further details were disclosed.171 
These protests once again resulted in the closing of the University of Prishtina and institutions of 
higher learning across the province.172 Ten journalists from the Prishtina radio and television 
station participated in the demonstrations with the students; they were expelled from the 
Communist Party the next day.173  
2.4. Aftermath 
 
On June 13th, Belgrade announced plans to increase Kosovar security forces. Interior 
Minister Franjo Herljević stated that, in addition to a doubling of the number of plainclothes 
officers, 1,000 uniformed police would be added.174 The expansion came as a result of what 
Yugoslav authorities believed had been an inadequate number of security forces to combat the 
rioting of the previous months.175 The Interior Minister also expressed anger at Kosovar officials, 
whom he believed had misled the central government concerning the actual conditions in 
Kosovo.176 As evidence of this, he made it known that Belgrade had offered to help when the 
demonstrations first broke out, but that Prishtina rejected this as an unnecessary measure.177  
Federal security forces eventually were dispatched, along with members of the armed forces, 
when the disturbances spread across the province. As well as a woeful lack of security personnel, 
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Herljević also “cited as major problems a steady migration of Slavic peoples from Kosovo and 
also what he called a passive resistance to authority in the region.”178  
The exit of high-ranking Kosovar officials continued with the resignation of SAP Kosovo 
President Xhavid Nimani on July 17th, a little over a month after the resignation of party chief 
Mahmut Bakali, who was facing disciplinary action by the party.179 While pledging his loyalty to 
the Communist Party, Nimani stated, “top provincial leaders…were politically responsible for 
outbursts of nationalism and separatism.”180 He also added that “intensive political action was 
necessary to establish responsibility of cadres on all levels,” which The Washington Post 
believed indicated a purge of the Kosovar leadership was on the offing.181 By August 1981, 500 
Party members were expelled during what was termed a “differentiation process” that ultimately 
failed to address the serious economic and social problems of the province, which many believed 
had led to the demonstration movement and the extreme underdevelopment of the region.182 
During March and April, more than 2,000 people were arrested for offenses connected 
with the demonstrations.183 Their crimes included aiding in the organization of the 
demonstrations, belonging to extremist groups that encouraged anti-state activities, producing 
and distributing counterrevolutionary materials, agitation, and engaging in a variety of dissident 
activities.184 Most served sentences of up to 60 days for a variety of minor offenses.185 Several 
individuals, though, were sentenced to prison terms that stretched as long as 15 years.186 By early 
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June, a reported 479 people had been sentenced, and further arrests continued through the 
ensuing months.187 According to 1986 estimates in NIN, a Belgrade magazine, ultimately 1,200 
people were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, and an additional 3,000 spent up to three months 
incarcerated for actions that occurred during the period of the uprisings.188 
2.5. Consequences for Relations Between Yugoslavia and Albania 
 
The uprising in Kosovo had significant consequences for the relationship between post-
Tito Yugoslavia and Enver Hoxha’s Albania. Almost immediately following the initial protests 
in Prishtina, the RPSSh began releasing a string of lengthy and scathing editorials and reports in 
the pages of the PPSh daily, Zëri i popullit, which spanned the remainder of 1981.189 Tirana 
strongly accused Belgrade of using excessive force against peaceful protestors, in the form of 
police and Yugoslav military units dispatched from Belgrade.190 While advocating the right of 
Albania to voice support for their suffering co-nationals in Kosovo, the RPPSh emphasized their 
indignation at being accused as a fomenter of discord amongst the protesting masses, instead 
laying the blame for creating the circumstances that birthed the uprising at the doorstep of the 
Belgrade authorities.191 The RPPSh also staunchly supported the right of Kosovar Albanians to 
have their semi-autonomous province raised to the equitable level of republic within the 
Yugoslav Federation, the denial of which was tantamount to “Great-Serb and anti-Albanian 
chauvinism.”192  
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Yugoslavia, though, was Albania’s principal trade partner.  As the alliance with the 
People’s Republic of China waned in the late 1970s, the dollar amount of Yugoslav exports to 
the RPPSh increased drastically from $11.9 million in 1972, to $28 million in 1978 (the year of 
Albania’s break with Beijing), and topping out at $60 million in 1979.193 That number was 
projected to double within five years.194 Also of note was Albania’s tenuous position within the 
international system after the termination of the Sino-Albanian partnership. After having 
received and then rejected partnerships with the Yugoslavs, Soviets, and the Chinese during the 
period from the Second World War to 1978, Enver Hoxha resolved that Albania would set its 
own course and emphasized a policy of “maximum self-sufficiency,” which was coupled with 
self-imposed seclusion in foreign affairs.195 Having a secure and friendly Yugoslavia next door 
was in Albania’s best interests. In a world divided into Soviet and American camps, Albania and 
non-aligned Yugoslavia had cultivated a mutually beneficial relationship.  As the external 
national homeland, Albania had to adopt a stance that recognized and sought redress for issues 
with co-nationals across the border, but did not press too forcefully and upset the delicate 
balance in relations with the SFRJ.196 In this case, the RPPSh failed to achieve this aim and the 
relationship was damaged, though not severed. 
It was not the inflammatory articles and editorials emanating from the Albanian press, 
though, that set the relationship permanently on a downward path.  On the night of May 23, 
1981, two small explosions were set off on the grounds of the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana.197 
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The RPSSh denied involvement in the incident, while Belgrade officials accused Albania of 
“irresponsible behavior.”198 A Radio Free Europe researcher went so far as to suggest that 
Belgrade or Tirana might have engineered the incident to intensify hostilities between the two 
countries.199 Needless to say, the Embassy explosions further exacerbated a tense situation.          
Relations between the SFRJ and the RPSSh regarding SAP Kosovo would continue to 
suffer for the remainder of the 1980s.  The educational and cultural cooperation over Kosovo that 
had been fostered between the two states during the late 1960s and 70s came to an end as a result 
of the demonstration movement.  Fearing Tirana’s ideological penetration of Kosovo, Belgrade 
abrogated cooperative agreements between Tirana and Prishtina television and radio in May 
1981.200 Marash Ajati, director of Radio Tirana, claimed that the abrogation occurred without 
merit, while ascribing the decision to suspend cooperative media activities to an attempt to 
obstruct the artistic and cultural development of Kosovo by “certain Serbian chauvinistic 
circles.”201 It must also be noted, though, that Radio Tirana and Radio Kukes broadcasting 
stations received a significant boost in power by the construction of a new transmitter that 
allowed broadcasts to be received within 60% of SAP Kosovo’s territory, which made it possible 
for many Kosovar Albanians to still receive educational and cultural broadcasts from across the 
border.202  
Belgrade also made the decision to suspend the RPSSh’s cultural exchange with Prishtina 
and ceased using Albanian textbooks published in Tirana for Kosovar schools and universities, 
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replacing them with books published in the SFRJ and translated from Serbo-Croatian.203 Though 
Yugoslav authorities clearly sought to isolate Kosovo from Albania, they did not sever all 
cultural and educational ties with Albania. As a means to improve relations with ethnic-
Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro, the SFRJ actually encouraged the expansion of 
educational contact between the University of Tirana and the Universities of Skopje and 
Titograd.204    
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CHAPTER 3: THE UPRISING AS CONTINGENT EVENT 
 
As Rogers Brubaker stated in his seminal work, Nationalism Reframed, “[n]ationalism 
has been both cause and effect of the great reorganization of political space that framed the ‘short 
twentieth century’ in Central and Eastern Europe.”205 This is mirrored in the tremendous 
upheaval experienced by Kosovo during this prolonged period of restructuring in the last 
century, which has continued into the present one as well. Nationalism served as a cause to many 
of the great changes. The quest for national unity was the driving force behind Montenegro and 
Serbia’s 1912 conquest of Kosovo, and its inclusion as a territory of Serbia and Montenegro in 
the first and of the SR Srbija in the second manifestations of Yugoslavia. The structure of the 
SFRJ itself was based on the multinational federal framework of the USSR, following the Soviet 
principle of “socialist in form but national in content.” Though antinationalist in policy, 
Yugoslavia, much like the Soviet Union, institutionalized “territorial nationhood and ethnic 
nationality as fundamental social categories.”206 Thus, the structure of the federal framework 
viewed the “nation not as substance but as institutionalized form.”207 
The 1946 Constitution of Socialist Yugoslavia was closely modeled after the 1936 Soviet 
Constitution. The constitution established six separate republics (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) that received the same formal right to secede as 
the Soviet republics did, but were granted more far-reaching fiscal authority within six regional 
bureaucracies.208 Within the federal structure, SR Srbija was linked to two autonomous sections, 
the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija 
(Kosmet). Vojvodina was granted significant autonomy, a separate governmental structure that 
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possessed independent decision making powers and an independent Supreme Court.209 Kosmet, 
on the other hand, was denied the independent powers granted Vojvodina.210 Both appendages 
were allowed representation on the federal legislature, but both had their internal affairs strongly 
guided by Serbia and were denied the right of secession.211    
The Fundamental Law of 1953, so sweeping it is sometimes considered a new 
constitution altogether, moved the state towards a more centralized system.212 Sovereignty was 
no longer housed in the guise of the republics, which were now denied the right of secession, but 
was instead granted to the proletariat.213 The social consciousness of the working class would 
evolve into a single Yugoslav one that supplanted prior national identities.214 The push towards 
centralization greatly impacted the fates of Kosmet and Vojvodina by removing their federal 
representation, which devolved to the Serbian Republic.215 The Fundamental Law, though, did 
express “for the first time the whole concept of socialist self-management based on direct social 
democracy and the assembly system,”216 which would become hallmarks of the Yugoslav 
socialist system as it progressed through the coming decades. 
A new constitution was put into place ten years later, in 1963. The new constitution 
introduced the theory of rotacija, which denied delegates the ability to serve on worker’s 
councils and assemblies simultaneously and restricted delegates to two terms.217 The new 
structure also encouraged specialists, economists, and managers to serve as delegates, thus 
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creating a more representative atmosphere that encouraged decentralization.218 Increased 
pressure to decentralize also led to increased powers for the republics, while the centralist 
“Yugoslavism” of the 1953 Constitutional Law gave way to “de-étatization.”219 For Kosovo, the 
new constitution meant a promotion from an autonomous region to autonomous province, giving 
it equal status with Vojvodina. This was window-dressing, though, as both were reduced to 
existences birthed by decision of the Serbian Assembly, completely eliminating their 
constitutional status at the federal level.220   
As previously mentioned on pages 20-21 of Chapter 2, the constitutional revisions in 
1968 brought to an end SR Srbija dominance in Kosovo and Vojvodina, until the rise of 
Milošević in the late 1980s. The final SFRJ constitution was drafted in 1974 and reaffirmed the 
quasi-republican status achieved by the two autonomous provinces in 1968. While the first 
Yugoslav constitution had accorded sovereignty and the right to secede to the republics, by the 
1974 version, these rights were accorded to “the peoples of Yugoslavia.”221 The “peoples” meant 
the “nations” of Yugoslavia (Bosnian Muslims, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, 
Slovenes). The Albanians and Hungarians of the state were “nationalities” and were not accorded 
the same right to secede. While on the surface Yugoslavia appeared to be a federal state, in 
actuality, the 1974 Constitution established a largely semi-confederal structure that portended the 
withering away of the state and bureaucratic management to that of social management in a 
“socialist self-governing community of working people and citizens.”222 The republics and 
autonomous provinces were linked by a common monetary policy, customs, transport, 
communications, and the underdevelopment fund, with Tito holding sway over foreign policy                                                         
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and the military.223 The republics had near-total veto power over any federal decision, with only 
Tito holding the power to override a veto; republican leadership was represented and controlled 
the main federal decision-making bodies: the state presidency and the federal cabinet.224 
For Yugoslavia, throughout the course of the constitutional history of the socialist state, 
the republics (and, for a time, the autonomous provinces) were essentially “defined as quasi-
nation states, complete with their own territories, names, constitutions, legislatures, 
administrative staffs, cultural and scientific institutions, and so on,”225 linked by their 
membership in the SFRJ and the one-party rule of the SKJ. While vociferously opposing 
manifestations of what it viewed as nationalism, the state defined itself through the nation in the 
guise of the republics, which served as the national homelands for the constituent peoples. In 
Yugoslav terminology, the constituent people were referred to as “nations”: the Bosnian 
Muslims, Montenegrins, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians.    
Sabrina Ramet astutely posited that the SKJ’s long-standing claim to possessing a 
nationalities policy could be seen as evidence that the Yugoslav government, potentially, 
believed the multiethnic composition of the state to be problematic and that involvement in this 
realm was politically legitimate.226 The SKJ also laid claim to having resolved the national 
question in the SFRJ. Prior to 1964, this claim was based on the belief “that nationalism, as 
politicized ethnicity, had been by and large eliminated.”227 This belief was highlighted in the 
1953 Fundamental Law, which stressed centralization and Yugoslavism. The 1963 Constitution 
moved away from unitarist Yugoslavism, which too closely mirrored the Greater Serbian 
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centralism of the pre-war Royalist Period. Thaddeus Gasinski believed that, at this point, it had 
become obvious that the nationality problem had not been resolved, but had been “swept under 
the rug” by communist officialdom.228 To remedy this issue, the SKJ’s Eighth Congress moved 
the state firmly away from ignoring nationality as a an issue to achieving resolution of the 
problem through “institutionalized patterns of cooperation and mutual accommodation [that 
would] become a stable part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist excess to be 
contained, defused, or even bypassed.”229 The 1963 Constitution laid the groundwork for this, 
while the 1968 constitutional changes and the 1974 Constitution cemented the idea of “nation as 
institutionalized form”230 and firmly moved the state away from viewing the nation as 
“collectivity but as practical category.”231 
The conditions that preceded the events of 1981 created the circumstances that 
encouraged “sudden fluctuations in the nationess”232 of Kosovar Albanians. By comprehending 
the 1981 Uprising as what Brubaker termed a “contingent event,” we can better understand its 
“transformative consequences.”233 
The over-arching conflict between the SFRJ, SAP Kosovo, and the RPSSh in 1981 can 
best be understood as an event-based national conflagration. Using the triadic view presented by 
Rogers Brubaker,234 the complexity of the relationships between these territorial units can be 
more clearly understood. The triadic relational nexus is represented by the interplay between a 
national minority, a nationalizing state, and an external national homeland. As Brubaker 
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discussed, however, these terms are “not fixed entities but variably configured and continuously 
contested political fields,” which specifically establish these as dynamic concepts.235  
In the context of the 1981 Uprising, the ethnic-Albanian population of Kosovo played the 
part of the national minority in Brubaker’s triadic relational nexus. Within Yugoslavia, the 
ethnic-Albanian population (the majority of which were concentrated within the SAP Kosovo) 
represented the fifth most populous national group in 1981, a number greater than the 
populations of the nations of Macedonians and Montenegrins and possessing only 23,000 fewer 
people than the Slovenes.236 As a nationality within the SFRJ, the Albanian population was 
denied many of the fundamental rights of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations: Serbian, Croatian, 
Bosnian Muslims, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. Since the end of the Balkan Wars 
from 1912-1913, except for a brief period during the Second World War when it was fused to an 
Axis-sponsored Greater Albania, Kosovo was an appendage of Serbia, despite outnumbering 
Serbs in the territory by a number greater than 5 to 1.237 Under the communist government of the 
SFRJ, Kosovo existed as a province of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, along with Vojvodina.    
The SFRJ, in many ways, fits the criteria of the nationalizing state in Brubaker’s analysis. 
The status of Yugoslavia in 1981, as a nationalizing state, was one that was not an “avowed or 
expressly articulated” 238 national stance by the state. Instead, it is the perception of being 
“nationalizing” as interpreted by the national minority and the external homeland that marks it as 
such.239  In itself, the SFRJ sought to eliminate nationality and nationalism as a factor in political 
life. To this end, prior to the mid 1960s, Yugoslavia held to the belief “that nationalism, as 
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politicized ethnicity, had been by and large eliminated.”240 Following the Eighth Congress of the 
SKJ in 1964 and the enshrouding of Yugoslav political life under the mantle of self-managing 
socialism, the Party came to believe “that institutionalized patterns of cooperation and mutual 
accommodation had become a stable part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist excesses 
to be contained, diffused, or even bypassed.”241 Simply put, the existence of a system of federal 
republics and provinces, which were—in the case of the republics—granted equitable powers 
and allowed high levels of autonomy from the political center, was the vehicle that solved the 
national problem in the SFRJ. Though a novel idea and one that held a tremendous amount of 
promise, the reality was that the SFRJ had institutionalized the nation, not eliminated it or 
pushed it further along the road to oblivion.  The shared equality of the republics bred 
resentment, and the codified inequality of the state’s nationalities and provinces created 
bitterness. 
While the constituent republics of the SFRJ represented the homelands of the nations of 
Yugoslavia, the ethnic-Albanian homeland resided outside of the Federation.  As such, Kosovo 
could not achieve the status of a republic, nor could the Albanians of Yugoslavia achieve the 
status of a constituent nation of the Federation. Despite tremendous advances in the status of the 
province and the expansion of rights enjoyed by the Albanian population of the SFRJ during the 
course of the late 1960s through the 70s, the SFRJ’s leadership and policies remained entrenched 
in the belief that an Albanian-dominated federal republic could never be created within 
Yugoslavia. Also, regardless of the largely de facto status of SAP Kosovo as a separate entity 
from SR Srbija, Kosovo would continue to exist as an appendage of the Serbian republic. This 
perception was fueled by the existence of policies that marked SAP Kosovo and the ethnic-                                                        
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Albanian minority as occupying a lesser status than the constituent republics and their 
corresponding nations within the Yugoslav Federation. 
The RPSSh occupied the position of the external national homeland for the Albanians of 
Yugoslavia and SAP Kosovo.  The homeland stance occupied by Albania in the drama of the 
1981 disturbances was the position of the state that felt a sense of responsibility for the welfare 
of the national minority, due to a feeling of shared nationhood that transcended boundaries of 
state and citizenship.242 The drama surrounding the protest movement forced Albania to carefully 
walk a fine line in pressing for an improved position for its co-nationals in neighboring 
Yugoslavia, while not completely alienating its principal trading partner and potential territorial 
guarantor.             
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CHAPTER 4: THE UPRISING AND THE PRESS  
 
4.1. The Power of Journalism  
 
While this work has focused largely on nationalism and the history of the 1981 Uprising, 
it also deals with language use and attempts to influence the discourse of a society. Under 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, centralized authority tightly controls the production and 
dissemination of information. State ownership and direction of the media, along with strict 
limitations on press freedoms, allows the state to dictate the content, tone, and tenor of the news 
broadcast over the radio, on television, and through periodical literature, such as newspapers.   
In Norman Fairclough’s seminal work, Language and Power, he ascribes to the mass 
media a “hidden power” that is derived from “hidden relations.”243 The relationship between 
producer and consumer is significant, “in that they [the producers] have sole producing rights 
and can therefore determine what is included and excluded, how events are represented, 
and…even the subject positions of their audiences.”244 While Fairclough attempts to peel away 
the layers of hidden power to reveal who the producers are,245 in authoritarian and totalitarian 
states, the actual person or people exercising power over media content is less hidden than in 
states with greater press freedoms: all roads lead to the centralized authority.   
This effect of media control can be immense. It has the potential for manipulative effects 
through its handling of causality and agency. This level of control also grants the state the ability 
to exert a tremendous influence in social reproduction of discourse through the homogenization 
of media output.246 The centralized authority is able to exert this discursive power over the media 
consumer through a system of constraints that have significant structural effects that permeate 
                                                        
243 Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (London: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1996). 
244 Ibid., 49-50. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid., 54-55. 
 48 
society. As Fairclough explains, “[i]f therefore there are systematic constraints on the contents of 
discourse and on the social relationships enacted in it and the social identities enacting them, 
these can be expected to have long-term effects on the knowledge and beliefs, social 
relationships, and social identities of an institution or society.”247 As history has shown in the 
People’s Socialist Republic of Albania and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, state 
media has historically had a tremendous influence on popular attitudes toward the Kosovo issue, 
which helped to foster the tensions that eventually led to the bloody confrontation between 
Yugoslav troops and irregulars and Kosovar guerilla forces, most notably the UÇK, from 1998 to 
1999.248  
This work, however, will focus on the images that communist Albania and Yugoslavia 
projected to their people, their region, and the world through state-run media during the Kosovar 
Uprising of 1981. Through their respective media outlets, the states sought to define in- and out-
groupings, notions of solidarity, levels of competence in response to the demonstrations, and 
their own freedom of action. To examine these ideas further, we much first establish the function 
of and approaches to journalism, then determine how they were applied in the cases of Yugoslav 
and Albanian media during 1981.   
Simply put, the function of journalism is “to enable citizens to better understand their 
lives and their position(s) in the world.”249 Its success or failure rests solely on achieving this 
goal. The three approaches to journalism, as outlined by Richardson, are: “journalism as 
entertainment, as a loudhailer for the powerful and privileged and as a commodity produced by a 
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profit-seeking business.”250 In regard to the subject matter under discussion in this work, the 
selections from the newspapers Borba and Zëri i popullit, the Yugoslav and Albanian sources we 
will focus on, clearly were intended to help citizens and interested parties better understand the 
issues at hand in Kosovo, as well as the wider implications, but they were also loudhailers for the 
powerful. The dissemination and promotion of solely the central authority’s views, in this case, 
was intended to manipulate the discourse surrounding the events of 1981 and influence the 
perceptions and interpretations of the incidents to suit the agendas of each state. For the SFRJ, in 
particular, this was a significant departure from the media agenda surrounding the last major 
demonstration movement in the Kosovar Province in 1968. The Yugoslav press had run 
independent, on-the-spot stories of the events as they happened, eschewing the role of simply 
loudhailer to the SKJ.251 In 1981, the press took a far more cautious approach to the 
demonstrations, printing only official statements supplied by provincial, republic, and federal 
authorities.252 
4.2. Sources 
 
Borba, typically translated as “struggle” from Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, began 
publication in 1922 as a pamphlet under the guise of an independent newspaper, but in fact as the 
organ of the outlawed Yugoslav Communist Party in Royalist Yugoslavia. Before being forced 
by government order to cease publication in 1929, Borba was edited by communist intellectuals 
in Zagreb who advocated for a free press, encouraged disobedience toward the monarchy, and 
fought against political persecution. Borba reemerged in 1941 as the newspaper of Tito’s 
partisans in the Second World War.  Following the German expulsion from Yugoslavia in 1944, 
it became the official organ of the ruling Communist Party. It was hailed by The Times, among                                                         
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the daily newspapers in Eastern Europe, as “the obvious choice for anyone who wishes to be 
informed of what is happening in the world outside” and for being “almost objective by 
comparison with the rest.”253 In the 1950s, following a series of dissonant exposés by Milovan 
Djilas254 which were denounced as revisionist and anti-Marxist by the Party’s central committee, 
Borba exercised a stronger level of self-censorship on national topics.255 This changed the tenor 
of the journalism and was described as “evidently the reason why such reporting is the dullest 
and least imaginative of all.”256 Borba ceased publication after the fall of communism in 
Yugoslavia, but briefly resurfaced on the scene in 2008 before permanently closing its doors in 
2009.   
Zëri i popullit, translated as The People’s Voice, was the official newspaper of the 
Albanian Party of Labor. It was founded in 1942257 and continued as the “propaganda voice”258 
of the Party until the end of one-party rule in Albania in 1991. It has since continued publication 
as the official media voice of the Socialist Party of Albania, the reformed progeny of Enver 
Hoxha’s Party of Labor. Zëri i popullit, much like the Soviet Union’s Pravda and Izvestia, was 
strictly a vehicle for the dissemination of Party propaganda and featured heavily censored and 
politicized foreign and domestic news articles.       
One way both Borba and Zëri i popullit manipulated popular perceptions and 
interpretations of the 1981 events were through face and facework: respectively, communicative 
concepts that establish an identity projected to the world and the ways in which that identity is                                                         
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fashioned and sustained. Another way images were fashioned was through the establishment of 
clear in-groups and out-groups through referential/nomination strategies, which we can analyze 
using the discourse-historical approach of Ruth Wodak.259 Through delineating carefully-crafted 
and projected images of the self during the crisis and by ascertaining and defining clear fellow 
group members and requisite outsiders in the national news, both states sought to influence 
events and their fallout by appealing to a need, internally and externally, for victims and 
perpetrators in the saga of 1981.  
4.3. Methodology 
 
The methodological framework used in this study is based on the multidisciplinary 
approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA, generally speaking, “is a theory and a 
method of analyzing the ways that individuals and institutions use language.”260 CDA assumes 
that discourses are heavily influenced by the time and location in which they occur and, as a 
result, can only be understood within their historical contexts.261 Therefore, taking into account 
the centrality of the historical contexts of the events under examination, I have employed the 
referential/nomination strategy in the construction of out-groups developed by Ruth Wodak262 in 
her discourse-historical approach to CDA in analyzing the material presented in this study. 
The next concepts under discussion in this work are those of face and facework. Face, in 
the words of Stella Ting-Toomey, “is a claimed sense of self-respect in an interactive 
situation.”263 It is, in essence, the identity projected to the outside world through 
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communication.264 Facework, on the other hand, is how that identity “is created and maintained 
in communicative interactions.”265 While face and facework have long been applied in the case 
of the individual in communicative interaction, scholarship in the past decade has utilized these 
concepts in the analysis of a variety of communicative situations between groups and entities.266 
The current work proposes that facework concepts can be carried over into the realm of national 
discourse. In particular, when examining the discourse employed under totalitarian and 
dictatorial systems, the face presented by the state to the inside and outside world exhibits 
markedly similar face wants to that of an individual. Just like an individual, most governmental 
and political groups want to appear competent and able, be respected, and seek to form or 
strengthen alliances with others. Also just like an individual, they choose their language and 
communication strategies in an attempt to secure these wants. To analyze the face wants of the 
state expressed in newspaper coverage, I have used Lim and Bowers’ notions of fellowship face, 
competence face, and autonomy face from their “Communication Model of Facework.”267   
While Lim and Bowers theorized that facework “refers to ways in which people mitigate 
or address…face threats,” such as face threatening acts (FTAs) like “accusing, rejecting, 
criticizing, or requesting,”268 the current work posits that facework and expressions of face wants 
are not solely the repository of conflict mitigation. These ideas, instead, can be used in all 
communicative situations.269 Face wants are also not solely reciprocal in nature, but can instead 
be used as mechanisms for projecting self-reflective images that are beneficial only to the                                                         
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producer’s prerogatives. The case of Albania’s and Yugoslavia’s media campaigns during the 
course of the Kosovar Uprising exemplifies this fact. 
According to the Lim and Bowers’ model, fellowship face is a face want that expresses 
the desire to be included.270 Fellowship face is enacted through expressions of solidarity, which 
are “oriented toward the fellowship face of the other.”271 It conveys the acceptance of the other 
as an in-group member through expressions of commonality in identity, historical cooperation, 
personal understanding, and empathy.272 Levels of solidarity are determined by the degrees “of 
‘in-groupness’ and ‘interpersonalness’ of a message and the directness with which the in-
groupness is expressed.”273 Table 1 is an adapted scale of the solidarity categories and example 
items from Lim and Bowers’ analysis.274 Categories toward the top of the scale express no to 
little solidarity, while those at the bottom express the highest levels of solidarity. Bold and 
underlined categories are present in the analysis of selections from Borba and Zëri i popullit. 
Table 1. Scale of Solidarity 
Category Example Items in Category 
Exclusion 
(to exclude from an in-group) 
It’s none of your business. 
We decided to kick you out of the group. 
You don’t deserve my friendship. 
Small talk 
(to talk about something that has no 
implications for the relationship) 
Did you read John’s paper? 
It’s raining outside. 
People are working hard these days. 
Impersonal similarity 
(to emphasize impersonal or generalized 
similarity) 
Wow, isn’t that a beautiful vase? 
We’re both Americans, aren’t we? 
Are you also from Texas? 
Attitude similarity 
(to emphasize similarities in attitudes, 
wants, and hobbies) 
We are both pro-choice people, aren’t we? 
Do you like that music? It’s my favorite. 
Don’t you want to get good grades like 
me? 
I like your sweater.                                                         
270 Ibid., 421. 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Category Example Items in Category 
Informal address Hi, pal. 
Hey, buddy. 
Hi, Jimmy. 
Hey, dude. 
Agreement 
(to agree or seek agreement) 
I had a similar thought. 
Do you agree with me? 
I think so, too. 
You are right. 
Social acknowledgement 
(to appreciate work-related aspects of the 
other) 
You are a good colleague. 
I know you have been busy. 
You are really enthusiastic. 
You won that scholarship, it’s great. 
Presupposition 
(to imply we are in a close relationship) 
You are going to help me, aren’t you? 
You had a date last night, didn’t you? 
We are buddies, aren’t we? 
Character appreciation 
(to appreciate the general personality of the 
other) 
You are really valuable to us. 
That’s very kind of you. 
You are very nice. 
Empathy 
(to show understanding of the other’s 
emotional state) 
I appreciate what you did for me. 
You look so sad. 
I understand what you are trying to say. 
I’m so happy for you. 
Cooperation 
(to emphasize the necessity to cooperate 
with each other)  
I’ll help you. 
We have to work on the problem together. 
We gotta help each other. 
Friendship reaffirmation 
(to express intimate emotions toward the 
other) 
I know I can trust you. 
You are a good friend. 
I like you a lot. 
Let’s work it out together 
Source: Tae-Sop Lim and John Bowers, "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact," Human 
Communication Research 17, no. 3 (1991): 429-431. 
 
Competence face, on the other hand, expresses the speaker’s desire for his or her abilities 
to be respected by others.275 According to Lim and Bowers, competence face is accomplished 
through Leech’s maxim of “approbation,” which is depicted through a minimization of blame 
and a maximization of praise of others by way of complimentary language toward abilities 
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and/or understatement of inabilities.276 This can also be expressed self-reflectively, as the 
speaker compliments or understates personal abilities. Table 2 is an adapted scale of the 
approbation categories and example items from Lim and Bowers’ analysis.277 Categories toward 
the top of the scale express no to little approbation, while those at the bottom express the highest 
levels of approbation. Bold and underlined categories are present in the analysis of selections 
from Borba and Zëri i popullit. 
Table 2. Scale of Approbation 
 
Category Example Items in Category 
Ridicule 
(to belittle the other by exaggerating the 
problem) 
It’s ridiculous. 
You screwed it up. 
You completely failed to do it. 
Blunt disapproval 
(to disapprove without understanding the 
problem) 
It’s weak. 
I don’t think it’s done right. 
It needs a lot more work. 
It needs to be redone. 
Focused disapproval  
(to shift the focus of disapproval from the 
whole to the major part) 
I think it needs a lot more evidence. 
I think you missed some major elements. 
I think your arguments are not clear. 
The evidence you provided seems to be 
irrelevant. 
Comparative disapproval 
(to compare the whole performance with 
certain desired states) 
It’s not up to par/standard. 
I think it’s not strong enough. 
I think it has to be improved. 
Moderation 
(to compare the major part with certain 
desired states) 
You didn’t prove your arguments with 
evidence. 
I think it lacks evidence. 
There isn’t enough evidence to support 
your claim. 
Resentment 
(to resent the other’s lack of effort) 
I think you could have done a much better 
job. 
I don’t think that you’ve given it your full 
efforts. 
I hoped you’d do a better job. 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Category Example Items in Category 
Aspiration 
(to aspire to a better performance) 
I think you can do better. 
I feel it’s not the best work you can do. 
I think it can be improved. 
Diminutive 
(to trivialize the problematic area) 
I know I’m asking for a lot, but it needs a 
little more research. 
I found a few problems in it. 
You need to work on finding some more 
evidence. 
I think it needs a few more things added. 
I think you missed a few important points. 
Suggestion 
(to suggest ways to make the performance 
even better) 
I think you gotta do a little more research 
to make it better. 
Could you find more relevant evidence to 
support it? 
Do you think you could do a little more 
research? 
You need to make the paper flow more 
naturally. 
You need to add more evidence to 
strengthen your arguments. 
I think you need to support your ideas with 
more evidence. 
It needs a little more work to be really 
good. 
Contradiction 
(to approve of some other aspects without 
understanding the problem) 
I know you put a lot of time and effort into 
it, but it just doesn’t have the focus you 
need. 
I really like the structure and style, but the 
information you provided is not relevant. 
Support  
(to approve of some other aspects with 
minimization of the problem) 
It has good potential but needs to be 
reorganized a bit. 
You have some good ideas, but you need to 
support them with evidence. 
You’re an excellent writer, but I think you 
need to add a few more facts. 
Admiration 
(to approve of the other without any 
reservation) 
It is an excellent paper. 
You did a very good job. 
Source: Tae-Sop Lim and John Bowers, "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact," Human 
Communication Research 17, no. 3 (1991): 433-435. 
 57 
Finally, autonomy face is addressed by Leech’s maxim of “tact,” which expresses the 
speaker’s respect for the other’s freedom in action and autonomy.278 As with competence face, 
autonomy face can also be expressed in a self-reflective manner that emphasizes the speaker’s 
own freedom of action and its need to be respected. Tact, in this case, is depicted by attempts to 
maximize (or minimize the loss of) freedom of action through presenting options or through 
indirectness and tentativeness.279 Table 3 is an adapted scale of the tact categories and example 
items from Lim and Bowers’ analysis.280 Categories toward the top of the scale express no to 
little tact, while those at the bottom express the highest levels of tact. Bold and underlined 
categories are present in the analysis of selections from Borba and Zëri i popullit. 
Table 3. Scale of Tact 
 
Category Example Items in Category 
Order 
(to demand forcefully) 
Write the group paper. 
Write the paper again. 
Obligation 
(to invoke the other’s obligation) 
You have to write the group paper. 
You owe it to me to write the group paper. 
You need to rewrite the paper. 
I know it’s imposing a lot, but you gotta 
write the paper again. 
Need 
(to state one’s desire) 
I need you to write the group paper. 
I want you to rewrite your paper. 
Please 
(to use a conventional politeness marker 
“please”) 
Write the paper on behalf of the group, 
please. 
Please write your paper again. 
Advice 
(to advise the other what to do) 
It’ll be a good idea for you to rewrite the 
paper. 
Why don’t you write the group paper? 
I suggest that you write the paper again. 
Maybe you can write the group paper. 
Our group paper has to be good to impress 
the teacher. 
I hope you would write the paper again. 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
 
Category Example Items in Category 
Indicative-mood conventional indirectness 
(to use a conventional form of indicative-
mood indirect request) 
Can you write the paper again? 
Will you write the group paper? 
 
Subjunctive mood conventional 
indirectness 
(to use a conventionalized form of 
subjunctive mood indirect request) 
I would like to ask you to write the group 
paper. 
Could you write the paper again? 
Indicative mood possibility inquiry 
(to ask possibilities using indicative mood 
conventional indirectness) 
What do you think about writing the group 
paper? 
Do you think you can rewrite the paper? 
Subjunctive mood possibility inquiry 
(to ask possibilities using subjunctive mood 
conventional indirectness) 
I was wondering if you could write the 
paper again. 
Is there any way you could write the group 
paper? 
Do you think you could work on the paper 
again? 
I would like to ask you what you think 
about rewriting it. 
Debt incurrence 
(to imply that the other will do one a favor 
by accepting the request) 
I’d greatly appreciate it if you could write 
the paper on behalf of the whole group. 
Could you please write the paper again? 
Unconventional indirectness 
(not to state the imposition explicitly) 
I think you are the best candidate to write 
the group paper. 
As you know, we need to do well on this 
project to get good grades. Is there 
anything I can help you with? 
Would it be too much to ask you to write 
the group paper? 
Would you mind working on the paper a 
bit more? 
Experimenting 
(to explore the possibility for the other to 
volunteer) 
Do you think you can take time to write the 
group paper? 
Do you have time to write the paper again? 
Would you be willing to work on the paper 
again? 
Would you consider writing the group 
paper? 
Imposition sharing 
(to share the responsibility) 
I think we should write the group paper 
together. 
Could we sit together and work on the 
ways to improve it? 
Source: Tae-Sop Lim and John Bowers, "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact," Human 
Communication Research 17, no. 3 (1991): 437-439. 
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4.4. Zëri i popullit  
 
4.4.1. Negative out-group qualities 
 
 The focus of Zëri i popullit’s out-group characterizations fell not on the non-Albanian 
populations of Yugoslavia, who we will discuss shortly, but instead on the collective leadership 
of the SFRJ. They highlighted this separation between the leaders and the led by appealing 
directly to the in-group Yugoslav population and singling out the leaders for censure. An article 
from the 23rd of April stated,    
“You, Messrs. Yugoslav politicians, need not listen to us if you do not wish to do 
so, but we are convinced that the peoples of Yugoslavia will listen to us and will 
understand our opinions, our sincere feelings, the fraternal feelings of 
Albanians.”281  
 
 To underscore their negative qualities, the Albanian press used historical associations to 
label Yugoslav government officials. One article harkened back to the days of Serb-centralist 
policies in Kosovo during the early and mid twentieth century. It stated that current government 
officials had brought forth “[n]ot only the shades of Ranković, but also the old ghosts of the 
Karageorgevićes.”282  
 Zëri i popullit also made an association between the Yugoslav regime and that of the 
genocidal Ustaša from the Second World War: “In the history of the Albanians, one does not 
find barbaric acts like those of the Ustaše, old and new.”283 This statement clearly constructed an 
image of a government that carried on the extremist-exclusionary ideals of Ante Pavelić’s fascist, 
terrorist organization, bent on eliminating those from political life who did not conform to ethno-
national standards and eliminating the undesirables of the state. This assertion also excused the 
Albanian people from any linkage with brutal or, as they stated, “barbaric” actions like those                                                         
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perpetrated by the extremist groups that emerged in Yugoslavia in the early to mid twentieth 
century.284  
While recognizing the horrific past of groups like the Ustaša, Zëri i popullit also 
recognized the bravery of the Yugoslav peoples who fought for and reclaimed their country from 
the Axis Powers in 1944: “The heroic struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia could not fail to 
arouse justifiable pride.”285 This pride, which was a positive motivation for change in the 
Yugoslav people, was said to have manifested differently in the current Yugoslav leadership, 
leading to  
“Yugoslav megalomania and chauvinism, claiming that virtually only they fought, 
only they made sacrifices, that it was only thanks to them that the other peoples 
followed their example and fought too. All this was transformed into a ‘feeling of 
superiority’ which has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.”286 
 
 The writer carried the anti-Marxist ideological argument further by stating that the 
Yugoslav leadership’s “feeling of superiority” was  
“[t]he worm…implanted in the ‘core of the red apple.’ It gnawed away, 
weakening the revolution and to justify this the blame was laid on Stalin, the 
Soviet Union, its genuine Leninist system and the ideology which had guided that 
system---Marxism-Leninism. Tito and company were made the anti-Stalinist and 
anti-Soviet heroes of the day by the international bourgeoisie. Their megalomania 
was increased ten-fold.”287 
 
These accusations make clear that Yugoslav officialdom, in the estimation of the Albanian 
leadership, was ideologically incorrect in their beliefs, having turned away from the ideological 
core of what they believed to be true Marxist-Leninism: Stalinism and the pre-Khrushchev 
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Soviet system. Officials gripped by narcissism, which was only increased by their acceptance in 
the anti-communist world, fueled this turning away from ideological correctness.   
 These connotations cast the Yugoslav leadership in a decidedly negative light to the 
audiences in Albania, Yugoslavia, and abroad. By associating the current Yugoslav leadership 
with Axis-affiliated extremist groups from the Second World War, the authors played on fears of 
nationalism and cycled back to visions of the violence that had gripped the Balkans forty years 
ago. The Albanian press asserted that the Yugoslav leadership’s arrogance had led the people of 
the SFRJ to a repeat of the same festering nationalisms of that era. In their view, this had been 
driven by the rejection of true Marxist-Leninism though Soviet-style Stalinism and led to Tito’s 
embrace of counterrevolutionary, self-management socialism. 
Zëri i popullit also made use of historical writings of the SKJ and their sponsored media 
arms to render an image of a government which had betrayed its own principles in denying the 
demands of the protesting Albanians in Kosovo. They quoted Tito’s pre-war words in Proletar 
as stating that the Albanians of Yugoslavia “‘were enslaved and earmarked for extermination’ by 
the ‘nationalist policy of the Great-Serb hegemonists’” in leadership positions of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia.288 Tito further specified in Proletar, in regard to the communists’ struggle against 
the royalist government of Regent Prince Paul, that “the aim of this struggle in which the masses 
of the people will strive with all their might, has to be the urgent solution of the national question 
in conformity with the principle of the democratic right of self-determination…”289 This was 
followed in the article by an extract from 1942 in which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
made known its stance that they had  
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“not renounced and never will renounce its principle, which was established by 
our great leaders and teachers Lenin-Stalin, the principle of self-determination up 
to the right of secession…The question of Macedonia, the question of Kosovo-
Metohia, the question of Montenegro, the question of Serbia, the question of 
Croatia, the question of Slovenia, the question of Bosnia and Hercegovina will be 
easily solved to everybody’s satisfaction.”290 
 
Despite these initial pronouncements, Yugoslavia’s leaders denied Kosovo the right of 
self-determination following the Second World War, and according to Zëri i popullit, the current 
Yugoslav leadership continued to deny the people of Kosovo their constitutional right to self-
determination.291 These statements aided the Albanian media in making it clear that the Yugoslav 
leadership from Tito to the present, following the Second World War in which Yugoslavs and 
Albanians fought side by side, had rejected the founding principles upon which the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia had based its nationalities and territorial policies and, instead, followed the 
anti-Marxist nationality policy of the pre-war Yugoslav state. This was made clear by stating, 
“The status of Kosova (after the Second World War) was decided under the dictate of the Great-
Serb chauvinist ideology, which was inherited from the Yugoslav Kingdom and preserved in 
post-war Yugoslavia.”292 
As the Albanian press presented the Yugoslav leadership as the out-group in the Kosovar 
imbroglio, they accused Yugoslav authorities and the state-run media of casting the 
demonstrators in a negative light, as labeling them as villains in the chaos that had engulfed 
Kosovo. Zëri i popullit stated that they believed “the brave Kosova students” had been 
erroneously accused of “acting like the gangsters of Chicago and putting little children in the 
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front of the demonstrations.”293 This gave the impression, in the view of the Albanian media, that 
the protestors were behaving like common criminals. 
 They also charged that the media in Yugoslavia had ignored the real reasons behind the 
revolts and had instead painted “the people of Kosova” as “counterrevolutionaries, chauvinists 
and irredentists,”294 further stating that “[t]hese people [Yugoslav authorities] have learned 
nothing from history. Only the Albanians, who have been their prey, are allegedly ‘chauvinists’ 
and ‘irredentists’.”295 
4.4.2. Fellowship Face 
 
Despite the clear portrayal of the Yugoslav leadership as the out-group in the Kosovar 
Uprising, the Albanian press focused their attention on conveying a feeling of acceptance 
towards the Yugoslav peoples, often citing the fraternal bond they felt toward all the nations and 
nationalities of Yugoslavia. The fraternal relationship that was described emphasized a strong 
historical connection, particularly cooperation between Albanians and Yugoslavs during the 
Second World War, and expressed solidarity in defending against possible future threats to 
Yugoslavia.  
“The history of the Albanians through the centuries and that of the National 
Liberation War have shown that the sons and daughters of our people have shed 
their blood to help the fraternal neighboring peoples. The lofty spirit of sacrifice 
and profound internationalist feelings characterize our people. We have always 
wanted good neighborly relations with Yugoslavia. Our stand is unalterable. If 
anyone, imperialism or social-imperialism attacks Yugoslavia, our people, 
socialist Albania will fight shoulder to shoulder with the peoples of Yugoslavia. 
This is what we have said and this is what we shall do.”296  
 
Zëri i popullit again spelled out the Albanian desire to aid their neighbor, and the brotherly 
feelings that had toward the Yugoslav people, by stating,                                                          
293 “Why were police violence and tanks,” About the Events in Kosova, 12. 
294 “Who Incites Hostility,” About the Events in Kosova, 21. 
295 Ibid., 31. 
296 “Why were police violence and tanks,” About the Events in Kosova, 17. 
 64 
“we are ready to give sincere assistance with all the forces of our noble hearts and 
minds to preserve the friendship with the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia, to 
safeguard the good neighborly relations which have been established, to assist our 
Albanian brothers in every direction as before, to develop commercial relations 
and cultural exchanges with them, as we do with the other peoples of 
Yugoslavia.”297  
 
Both of these statements articulated the desire on the part of the Albanian leadership, through the 
press, to present a vision of solidarity between Albanians and the people of Yugoslavia, with 
whom they had shared a history of mutual cooperation and a sense of fraternity.   
As fellow members of the Albanian nation, the Kosovar protestors were described as part 
of a people “who have always fought with sword in hand,”298 and who have “always defended 
[themselves] heroically and…triumphed over…enemies because [they have] always been in the 
right.”299 According to the article, the demonstrations against what the Kosovars saw as injustice 
and oppression was their embracement of the historic fighting spirit of all Albanians.  In the 
protestors’ struggles, they were described as not alone, but as  
“the grandsons and daughters of the heroes of our people, Isa Boletini, Bajram 
Curri, Abdyl and Naim Frashëri, Sulejman Vokshi, Ymer Prizreni, Azem and 
Shote Galica, Çerçiz Topulli and Selam Salaria, the brothers and co-fighters of 
Hajdar Dushi, Hysni Kapo, Miladin Popović, Emin Duraku, and thousands of 
heroic Albanian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian partisans who fought and shed 
their blood together, as brothers in Yugoslavia for the freedom, independence and 
self-determination of the peoples of Yugoslavia.”300  
 
Thus Zëri i popullit presented an image of these groups (Albanian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, 
and Yugoslavian) as linked through their determination to fight for what was right, of the 
Kosovars’ membership in the pantheon of Albanian heroes, and of the struggle for self-
determination which all of the above groups shared with those who fought for the liberation and 
self-determination of the peoples of Yugoslavia during the Second World War.                                                           
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Though often showing these heroic visions of the Albanian nation, many of the 
pronouncements espoused by Zëri i popullit present a fellowship face that instead uses 
expressions of commonality in victimhood to link the Albanian people of the Socialist Republic 
of Albania with co-nationals in Yugoslavia. An article from April 8th, 1981, in decrying the 
oppression being meted out against the Albanians of Kosovo, explained that “[n]ever have they 
[the Albanians] attacked and partitioned the territories of other peoples.  These things have been 
done to the Albanians.”301 This position is extrapolated over the breadth of Albanian history: 
“The capitalist and imperialist world has perpetrated many evils against the Albanian people at 
all times.”302 By emphasizing the suffering of the Albanian people throughout their history, Zëri i 
popullit not only presented a “face” that had experienced unjust treatment to the audience beyond 
Albania, but it also created a bond of communal suffering with co-nationals in Kosovo. 
The goal of projecting fellowship face is to establish “levels of solidarity: the degree of 
‘in-groupness’ or ‘interpersonalness’ of a message and the directness [bluntness] with which the 
in-groupness is expressed.”303 Categories and examples of solidarity levels can be found in Table 
1 from pages 53-54. In the context of examining newspaper discourse in Albania, we see clear 
and direct statements of solidarity professed, establishing visible boundaries of inclusion. 
 In the case of Albania and the state-news organ Zëri i popullit, the nations and 
nationalities of Yugoslavia were clearly established as an in-group, independent of the Yugoslav 
political leadership. Zëri i popullit expressed their connection with the Yugoslav peoples through 
examples of “friendship affirmation,” which shows a high level of solidarity and of 
interpersonalness.304 A clear example of this was expressing intimate notions of fraternity 
                                                        
301 Ibid., 16. 
302 “The Status of a Republic,” About the Events in Kosova, 63. 
303 Lim and Bowers, "Facework,” 428. 
304 Ibid. 
 66 
between Albanians and the peoples of Yugoslavia. The Albanian press also established 
fellowship with the peoples of Yugoslavia through examples of “cooperation…, which show 
strong interpersonalness,” but less directly than friendship affirmation.305 Zëri i popullit authors 
acknowledged past cooperation in the Second World War between the two groups and pledged 
future cooperation in armed defense of Yugoslavia should the need ever emerge again. 
 At the same level of solidarity and directness as cooperation, Zëri i popullit described 
fellowship between Albania and the protestors through “empathy.”306 They showed identification 
with the plight of the demonstrations’ participants by expressing strong communal feelings of 
victimhood. The injustice and oppression that the protestors were feeling was something that all 
Albanians had experienced throughout their common history. “Character appreciation, which is 
direct and not limited to any specific level of interpersonalness,” was also expressed, although 
character appreciation is not considered by communications theorists to be as face-supporting as 
the previous categories.307 Examples of this occurred when notions of a characteristic fighting 
spirit were communicated.   
4.4.3. Competence Face 
  
Zëri i popullit expressed its view of the competency of the Kosovar Albanians by 
complimenting their ability to sift through the misleading information emanating from across 
Yugoslavia. These inflammatory articles and reports, encouraged and sometimes authored by the 
Yugoslav leadership, sought to label the Albanian protestors as extreme nationalists, while 
promoting the brotherhood and unity of the nations and nationalities of the SFRJ, which Zëri i 
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popullit labeled as “jingoistic.”308 An article titled “Who incites hostility amongst the peoples of 
Yugoslavia?” from April 1981 stated,  
“[i]t is not easy to deceive a brave and mature people like the Albanian people 
who live in various parts of Yugoslavia with such ruses, to deceive the workers, 
peasants, students and honest intelligentsia, who are conscious about the existence 
of their nation and concerned about its future.”309  
 
The Albanian press also voiced praise for the expertise of the Albanians of Kosovo in 
skillfully negotiating multiple levels of deception, using this as further proof of their 
competence. With this, they focused on the Kosovar Albanians’ ability to recognize actual 
Albanian agents of the government versus those who were simply coerced into betraying their 
people by the UDB.   
“They [the Kosovar Albanians] know how to differentiate the lackeys from the 
honest sons and daughters of the people, whom the UDB tries to compromise by 
forcing them to speak and to send telegrams for propaganda purposes.”310  
 
Albanians in Yugoslavia were further lauded for the constructive manner in which they 
had conducted themselves, drawing a picture of a people who were competent as citizens, 
measured and thoughtful in their social and political actions. They were noted to have been a 
positive element in Yugoslavia since the end of the Second World War, despite the constant 
oppression they faced from the state. 
“The only positive and unbiased factor in this Federation is the Albanian factor. 
The Albanians in Yugoslavia were treated with contempt, politically, 
economically and from the cultural-educational aspect. At the same time however, 
they have been the most tolerant and realistic factor in the political-economic 
chaos into which post-World War Two Yugoslavia was plunged, a chaos which 
was a burden especially on the Albanians.”311 
 
While the Yugoslav state may have oppressed their co-nationals in Yugoslavia, the 
Albanian press did recognize changes that had improved life in Kosovo, focusing on the opening                                                         
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of Albanian schools and the integration of Albanian culture and sciences into existing 
institutions’ curricula. In this way, Zëri i popullit also labeled the people of Yugoslavia as 
competent, at least in their more recent pro-Albanian actions. 
“We have asserted and we assert again that during the past decade Albanian 
education and culture in Kosova (and to a lesser extent in Macedonia and 
Montenegro) have taken a laudable step forward. The opening of Albanian 
schools and the important University of Prishtina, the use of the Albanian literary 
language, the development of Albanian songs, dances and folklore, and elaborated 
music, of Albanian literature and Albanological sciences, etc. along with the 
culture of the peoples of Yugoslavia, have received and impulse such as has not 
been seen for a considerable time. The reasons for this are known and we do not 
want to dwell on them here. Hence, we look and compare the past with the 
present and we see the positive changes made in these fields.”312  
 
Praise and the construction of an image of competence for the University of Prishtina and its 
students (Albanian and non-Albanian) continued in an article from the 26th of May that was 
written by a group of Albanian academics who had spent time in Kosovo. They declared, “[w]ith 
pleasure and admiration we have closely followed the persistent and very fruitful efforts of the 
University of Prishtina,” and acknowledged, “the scholars of Kosova have made giant strides 
forward.”313  
Zëri i popullit emphasized that they were quite willing to praise the achievements of the 
Yugoslav people and regime in Kosovo, but also reserved the right to criticize when the situation 
warranted it.   
“The Yugoslav press accuses us of ignoring the positive changes which have been 
made in Kosova.  But this is not so. Whatever is right we admit and defend, 
whatever is unjust we denounce and condemn!”314 
 
Though largely concentrating on issues of competency within the confines of Yugoslavia, 
the writers of Zëri i popullit also focused their attention on the role of the People’s Socialist                                                         
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Republic of Albania. Of particular note, they heaped praise on the state for being a major factor 
in promoting peace and stability.  
“Because it pursues a principled, correct and unwavering policy, because it sticks 
to its course consistently and with determination, Albania is an important factor of 
peace and stability, security and defence in the Balkans and Europe, as has been 
its tradition throughout its long history.”315  
 
The article asserted this stance, while decrying Yugoslavia’s courting of the Cold-War Powers as 
a dangerous game for the region and the continent. 
Projections of competence face have the aim, through levels of approbation, of approving 
of “the other if at all possible, and if not, to minimize both the quantity and quality of the 
problem.”316 Categories and examples of levels of approbation can be found in Table 2 from 
pages 55-57. The strongest competence face technique that offers the most face saving is 
“‘admiration,’ which approves of the other without reservation.”317 Zëri i popullit used 
“admiration” to express approbation for their co-nationals in Yugoslavia. They used this 
technique to offer unqualified praise for the Albanians of the SFRJ, who they stated had 
successfully negotiated through the deceptive and misleading information presented by the 
Yugoslav press and authorities. 
Unsurprisingly, Zëri i popullit did not extend these statements of admiration to the 
Yugoslav authorities. However, weaker qualified statements of “support” were offered by Zëri i 
popullit to the Yugoslav regime in praise of the educational, cultural, and artistic advances made 
in regards to the Albanian population over the previous ten years, particularly in Kosovo. The 
qualifications were presented by noting the length of time it took for those advances to be made 
and the problems associated with the regime’s reaction to the demonstrations in the region. In a 
                                                        
315 “The Status of a Republic,” About the Events in Kosova, 63. 
316 Lim and Bowers, "Facework," 432. 
317 Ibid. 
 70 
similar vein, academics from Albania gave praise to the recent positive developments in higher 
education, while acknowledging similar problems. 
4.4.4. Autonomy Face    
 
A consistent theme in the Albanian press’s coverage of the Kosovar demonstrations was 
their emphasis on autonomy: their right and freedom to express judgments, feelings, and 
opinions on the matter. When accused by the Yugoslav leadership of interfering in the internal 
affairs of SAP Kosovo and the SFRJ, Zëri i popullit responded,  
“Albania has not interfered and is not interfering in the internal affairs of 
Yugoslavia. This is a basic principal of our policy. In expressing our views about 
the recent events in Kosova, we are not interfering in the internal affairs of 
Yugoslavia. But we are raising our voice, and we have the right to raise it, when 
injustices are done to our brothers, when violence and repression are used against 
them, when such slogans as Albanian chauvinism, irredentism etc. are used to 
discredit the Albanian youth and people of Kosova. We have this right, just as 
Yugoslavia and any other state has the right to defend and demand justice for its 
own national minorities.”318  
 
In expressing their absolute right to maximize their freedom of action in responding to 
developments in Kosovo, the Albanian press further stated,  
“Socialist Albania and the newspaper ‘Zëri i popullit’ have greater right than 
anyone else to express their opinion about the situation in Kosova, about the 
murders and savage tortures which are committed by the UDB and the Serbian 
army against the Albanians of Kosova.”319  
 
At the same time, they made it known, rhetorically, that it would be senseless to assume that the 
Albanian leadership and press would have nothing to say in relation to attacks on co-nationals in 
a neighboring state, particularly when media sources around the globe had already joined in the 
discussion. 
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“Did the Yugoslav leadership expect the Albanian press to say nothing about the 
tragedy which that leadership caused in Kosova, when for weeks on end the entire 
world press has been talking about and condemning the ferocity displayed?”320 
 
 The Albanian press did not limit their expression to discussions of the attacks themselves, 
but also commented on underlying political issues. The influence of a heavy debt burden to 
Western creditors and dependence on industrial trade with the Soviet Union321 made the SFRJ 
suspect in the eyes of the Albanian communists. They asserted that the Yugoslav leadership was 
corrupted by their reliance on imperial capitalists and Marxist-Leninist revisionists (i.e. the 
United States and the USSR, respectively). As a means to convey their autonomy by asserting 
their ability to conduct themselves free of any outside control, Zëri i popullit aired the following: 
“We Albanian communists are masters in our own house, and we pursue the 
policy which we consider the best and most correct. Others may not accept it. 
That is their right. Our people supervise and judge us. The facts, life, work, all 
show that the Albanian people support and defend the correct line of the Party and 
their state with all their strength.”322 
 
 Albania, having split with past sponsors in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, 
considered itself independent of Great-Power influence. 
In expressions of autonomy face, the focus of analysis is on the use of “tact.”323 The goal 
of tact is to “minimize the actual amount of imposition” portrayed.324 Categories and examples 
of levels of tact can be found in Table 3 from pages 57-59. In the case of Zëri i popullit 
expressing autonomy, they did so using a self-reflective vision of the “need” category of tact 
measurement, in which one simply states one’s desire to do something, out of necessity, while 
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acknowledging a moderate level of imposition.325 In the case of press coverage The Albanian 
press clearly professed the desire and their right to state their opinions regarding the incidents in 
Kosovo, which Yugoslavia challenged as interfering in the internal affairs of the state. By 
professing their opinions on the causes and conduct of the protests while exclaiming their 
innocence in interfering in Yugoslavia, Albania could project to their people, the peoples of 
Yugoslavia, and the outside world that they felt strongly about the injustices being perpetrated 
against their co-nationals in Kosovo, but had nothing to do with aiding in fomenting the discord 
that occurred in the province. 
4.5. Borba 
 
4.5.1. Negative out-group qualities 
 
The focus of Borba and the Yugoslav authorities’ use of referential/nomination strategies 
was to create images of otherness and criminality in the demonstrating groups. They achieved 
this by clearly and concisely constructing the image of the “other” with qualities that branded it 
negatively as an out-group separate from the law-abiding norm of Yugoslav society. One method 
they used to signify the offending out-group of demonstrators was by labeling them as Yugoslav 
outsiders or people foreign to Kosovo and Yugoslavia. 
In a late-March issue of Borba, Aslam Fazlija, president of the Presidium of the SK 
Prishtina, called the demonstrators from the March 26th incidents “foreign groups of students.”326 
By labeling them as such, Fazlija consciously separated the offending party of protestors from 
the “good” Kosovar students that did not participate in disruptive and harmful actions against the 
state. Instead, he implied it was the foreigners, who had been allowed to enter the country and 
pursue their education, that were the source of the problems.                                                           
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Other Yugoslav leaders accomplished this branding by painting the protestors as 
members of alien groups dedicated to the overthrow of the Yugoslav system. Following the 
confrontations of early April, SAP Kosovo President Xhavid Nimani described a portion of the 
demonstrators as being “part of an entity representing an integral part of the organizations and 
agencies of an internal and external enemy.”327 While acknowledging an external enemy threat 
present in the protests, he highlighted a belief that a portion of these enemies were part of an 
established and known series of outside groups that posed a tangible threat to Yugoslavia and 
were capable of stirring up resistance in Kosovo. In essence, he was asserting that these people 
were part of a covert invasion. He further stated that these “enemies internal and external have 
always aimed to break the brotherhood and unity of our nations and nationalities.”328 With this, 
he attached a timeless quality to the intentions of the enemies of Yugoslavia whose focus was to 
destroy the ideological underpinnings of the state. 
While Nimani characterized the enemy groups as ones capable of acting on foreign soil 
under orders from outside entities, Fadilj Hoxha, member of the Presidency of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of 
Communists, stated that “[t]he student demonstrations and several other transgressions were only 
a pretext for an organized attack by an outside enemy of self-government, socialism, and 
Yugoslavia’s non-alignment.”329 This means that the demonstrations, in the estimation of Hoxha, 
were possibly only the opening salvos of an invasion or other coordinated action directed at 
Yugoslavia. This enemy, because it was outside of and hostile to Tito’s non-aligned movement 
and opposed to Yugoslavia’s ideological commitments, would likely either be from the alliance 
system of the United States or the Soviet Union.                                                                
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Enemy demonstrators were identified in these sources as opponents of Yugoslavia’s 
ideological and territorial unity who possessed counterrevolutionary designs against the state.  
Fazlija, again in reaction to the March 26th demonstrations, said that the enemy forces were 
focused on “destabilizing and breaking the unity of our country.”330 Nimani believed that the 
enemy had “goals against socialism, self government, autonomous and non-aligned 
Yugoslavia.”331 The enemies had “counterrevolutionary designs that work to smash our socialist 
self-governing system, jeopardizing our territorial integrity and the sovereignty of our 
country.”332 
The presidents of the Serbian Party Presidium and the Socialist Republic of Serbia 
echoed this sentiment, releasing a joint statement positing that the enemy’s goal was to smash 
“the brotherhood and unity of the nations and nationalities of Kosovo and encourage the 
disintegration of the political system of socialist self-government.”333 Fadil Hoxha claimed that 
these acts of protest were “counterrevolutionary.”334  
Specific vocabulary aimed at promoting the idea of the protesters as liars and criminals 
was also present in these newspaper selections. Fazlija made reference to the character of the 
enemy by stating that he/she “stealthily demonstrates,”335 which gives the impression that the 
protesters were sly and secretive, hoping to avoid detection like an average criminal. Nimani 
labeled them as “deceitful masses”336 that used lies and manipulation to achieve their goals.       
Yugoslav authorities made appeals to the Albanian people by feeding on their fear of 
nationalism, a fear shared with the other peoples of Yugoslavia. The enemy demonstrators were                                                         
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stated as coming from an “Albanian nationalistic position,”337 while professing “extreme 
Albanian nationalistic and irredentist mantras.”338 They “identified with nationalistic groups”339 
and identified with “Albanian nationalism, irredentism, lies and demagoguery.”340 As for appeals 
to the Albanian people, Nimani identified the demonstrators as being “against the Albanian 
nationality itself.”341 Fadilj Hoxha expressed that the demonstrators intended “no good for, above 
all, the Albanian people.”342 
Through pronouncements such as these, the Yugoslav leadership sought to clearly define 
the out-group of demonstrators in terms that would carry weight with the peoples of Yugoslavia, 
while potentially influencing opinions outside of the country as well. With the well-known 
experience of the Second World War and the Partisan victory, Yugoslav leaders etched a vision 
of invading forces from abroad acting through the protest movement, thus harkening to visions 
of invading forces from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The fear of hostile forces from the 
camps of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, was also played upon, a trope 
that had remained alive and well since the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948, when visions of Soviet 
invaders seemed likely to become reality.   
The out-group, as constructed, rejected the ideological pillars upon which the state was 
supported: brotherhood and unity, self-governing socialism, neutrality, and non-alignment. They 
lied and acted like common criminals. These enemies were nationalists who, like groups such as 
the Ustaša or Četniks from the World War II era, sought the destruction of Yugoslavia through 
potentially violent means. Much like a protective parent, the Yugoslav leadership purported to 
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know what was best for the Albanians of Kosovo and sought to advise them against participation 
in protests that were in the worst interests of their own people.         
4.5.2. Fellowship Face 
 
Notions of fellowship face were expressed in a variety of ways by Yugoslav authorities 
via the media. One face want articulated was that of communal distress. In describing the dire 
economic state of Kosovo that helped lead to the demonstrations in late March, Aslan Fazlija 
expressed that “currents in economic inconsistency affect the whole front in our country, and in 
Priština.”343 In this statement, the state official made clear that the economic issues plaguing 
Prishtina and Kosovo were evident across the country. By creating an image of shared suffering, 
it presented the readership with the notion that they were not alone and that their neighbors in the 
federal republics felt the same burden.      
While this burden was something that all peoples of Yugoslavia shared, the peoples of 
Kosovo and Yugoslavia were working toward communal prosperity for all, according to leaders 
of the SAP Kosovo and the SR Srbija. Aslam Fazlija assured the people of Kosovo that all 
possible means were being utilized to improve their lot and to improve the situation for the entire 
country. He stated,  
“[I]n this moment, a great degree of mobilization of our socialist forces are in the 
execution of real works of economic stabilization and strengthening, in the 
continued construction of the system of defense and communal self-help, in the 
continued strengthening of brotherhood and unity in the community of all nations 
and nationalities, and in the struggle against Albanian, Serbian, and all other 
nationalist and enemy movements.”344 
 
Fazlija may have been confident in the work that was being done to improve life for all, but the 
party and republic-level executives of Serbia called for all parties in the republic to increase 
efforts in promotion of communal prosperity. In a joint statement, they called for “all citizens of                                                         
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our republic to pursue full vigilance in organization and to employ emphatically in their daily 
action for the further prosperous development and universal advancement of our whole 
community.”345  
A major component in media projections to the populace and wider world was the view 
that a vast number of individuals across the province were fundamentally opposed to the actions 
of the demonstrators. The day after the initial protests on March 11th, Borba reported, “local 
student and worker political organizations, the university, and citizens condemned this 
transgression as a local detriment.”346 The rioting that occurred during the demonstrations of 
April 1st and 2nd was reported to have been “met with the disapproval of the working people and 
all Kosovo’s organized political forces”347 after interfering with economic activity and the free 
flow of traffic in the educational districts of Prishtina.   
Workers of the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works in Mitrovica, in a telegram directed to the 
Presidency of SAP Kosovo and the Presidium of the League of Communists of Kosovo, stated 
that they “pointedly condemn these enemy actions,”348 in reaction to the demonstrations that 
occurred on the 1st and 2nd of April.  In a similar telegram directed to the executives of the 
League of Communists, the SFRJ, and the SAP Kosovo, workers from thirteen companies in 
Trbovlje, Slovenia, pronounced their backing of the government.  The workers, represented by 
the unit “Rudis,” stated their “full support for bold actions in decisively opposing all who prey 
on the inheritance of our revolution.”349  
Political leaders also made a point to emphasize the lack of support amongst the 
population for the actions of the demonstrators.  Following the rioting, the two chief executives                                                         
345 “Narod Oštro.” 
346 “Izgrad Grupe Studenata.” 
347 Ibid. 
348 R. K., “Radnici Spremni da Brane Tekovine Revolucije,” Borba (Belgrade), April 3, 1981, 3. 
349 Borba (Belgrade), April 10, 1981, 3. 
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of the province, SAP Kosovo President Xhavid Nimani and CK SK Kosovo President Mahmut 
Bakali, asserted that “local-political organs and all working people and citizens of Kosovo flatly 
oppose the carriers of these enemy activities.”350 A few weeks later, at a meeting that included 
the CK SKJ President Dušan Dragosavac, Nimani and Bakali again expressed their belief that 
most people did not support the protest movement or interference in the internal affairs of the 
state by outside entities:   
“In the meeting, it was asserted that the widest majority of the masses of the 
working people, citizens and youth of Albanian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Turkish, 
Muslim and other nations and nationalities of Kosovo, together with all nations 
and nationalities of Yugoslavia, decisively condemned and dismissed the 
pretensions towards our country as interference in the internal affairs of 
Yugoslavia.”351  
 
During the same meeting, they further described “the Kosovar nations and nationalities’ 
determination to oppose the misuse of the Albanian people’s real interests with the nations and 
nationalities of Yugoslavia for the further development of good, neighborly cooperation.”352 
Tahir Nalbani, Prizren Municipal Party Committee Secretary, also commented on the prior 
demonstrations and reacted to media attacks from Albania: “[I]n all forums, an expression of 
unified condemnation of counterrevolutionary irredentist and enemy forces in Kosovo had 
emerged.”353  
Not only did an allegedly significant segment of the population oppose the 
demonstrations, but many individuals and groups offered to directly aid in putting down the 
uprising, according to Borba reports.  In an article from the 3rd of April, it was stated, “in the 
local-political organizations of the province, numerous telegrams from the worker collectives 
and from the community/district level have arrived, pledging assistance in the efforts to oppose                                                         
350 “Narod Oštro.” 
351 “Narod Odbacuje.” 
352 Ibid. 
353 J. Marković, “Nove Neistine Iz Tirane,” Borba (Belgrade), April 25, 1981, 3. 
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further enemy demonstrations.”354 The proletariat from the worker organization Metaljik in 
Đakovica pledged to the League of Communists of Kosovo and Yugoslavia “their readiness to 
defend the inheritance of the revolution and the development of our socialist self-governing 
system.”355 Workers from the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works, in reaction to the demonstrations, 
expressed their “full readiness through [their] means to defend against this and like actions.”356 
An ideologically correct front was also presented in Borba opposing the 
counterrevolutionary currents of the demonstrations.  According to the joint meeting of the 
Kosovar executive leadership following the disturbances of the 1st and 2nd of April,  
“[C]ommunities, worker collectives, and schools expressed their readiness and 
determination, as the working people of Kosovo, to maintain the inheritance of 
our great liberation struggle, the socialist revolution, the brotherhood and unity of 
the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, minted in the War of Liberation and 
the socialist construction of our country, and to persist consistently in Tito’s way 
of the socialist development of our society.”357 
 
Nalbani of Prizren further stated,  
“[A] manifestation of brotherhood and unity of our nations and an awareness 
regarding the joint inheritance of the national revolution emerged in parallel,. . .In 
the entirety of this period, the working class of Prizren has expressed a larger 
class awareness, a commitment for manufacturing and production, and a belief in 
the greatness of the internal works of the worker’s organizations.”358  
 
Through this, the leadership of Kosovo presented the image of an ideologically-pure society that 
was aligned with the attitudes and decisions of the Party, committed to the ideals of the 
Revolution, the path of Tito, and the worker’s movement. 
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Much like Zëri i popullit’s presentation of the “empathy” level of solidarity,359 the 
Yugoslav press presented a similar fellowship face. In this case, Borba portrayed an environment 
of communal economic distress, where the residents of economically disadvantaged Kosovo 
were linked with the nations and nationalities across the country. The Yugoslav authorities 
expressed notions of “cooperation” that were focused on the people and government working 
communally to extricate the country from economic distress. 
Borba indicated that different groups projected support for the governments’ actions 
against the demonstrators through expressions of “attitude similarity,” which portrays “mild 
levels of solidarity by expressing common ground or informality very indirectly,”360 and by 
giving print space to groups of citizens showing an alliance with the government. This was 
exemplified by letters to the government printed in the newspaper from worker group “Rudis” 
and workers from the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works, who expressed their condemnation of the 
demonstrations and their support for government actions to halt the wave of protests. Borba also 
added to the projection of fellowship through attitude similarity in its depiction of opposition to 
the protest movement as widespread: according to Borba, citizens throughout Yugoslavia 
disagreed with the protestors’ methods, at the very least. 
Strong waves of “cooperation” accompanied expressions of “attitude similarity” in the 
Yugoslav press through statements of cooperative efforts between civilians and the government 
in putting down the protest movements. These were largely expressed through groups’ desire to 
volunteer aid to government authorities. Groupings like the Metaljik workers organization in 
Đakovica, as well as those from the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works and the Kosovar proletariat, all 
pledged assistance in the common cause with Prishtina and Belgrade officials.                                                         
359 For solidarity levels, see Table 1 on pages 53-54. 
360 Lim and Bowers, "Facework," 432. 
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4.5.3. Competence Face 
  
Yugoslav authorities sought to cement proof of their competency through the media by 
continuously depicting a vision of success in dealing with the protest movement.  Projecting an 
image of local elements silencing the demonstrations highlighted these attempts.  Aslan Fazlija 
said in regard to the March 26th demonstration, “Student demonstrations from the 26th of March 
were organized and initiated by enemy forces, but efforts that misguided a wider circle of 
students did not succeed. The students and working people of Priština already have pointedly 
condemned the enemy action and its perpetrators.”361  He went on to state that local elements 
even took an active role in suppressing the protests, “[o]wing to the political action of the 
communists, instructors, and students of the University, as bodies of protection and self-defense, 
the demonstrations were dispersed.”362  
Following the protests and riots of early April, Xhavid Nimani echoed similar sentiments 
by stating that “the enemy did not succeed due to the ample masses of citizens, youth, Albanians, 
and members of other nations and nationalities of Kosovo and Yugoslavia who enthusiastically 
[opposed] the enemy forces.”363 He also held that “[e]nemy elements did not succeed nor will 
they succeed to implement their aims in Kosovo, nor anywhere in our country,” and a few lines 
later stated, “Enemy elements and their demonstrations did not succeed.”364 These statements 
were spoken in regard to the demonstrators’ attacks on the ideological and territorial integrity of 
Kosovo. 
Another key way in which the Yugoslav leaders attempted to deflect responsibility for 
the poor conditions at the university that precipitated the demonstrations of the 11th and 26th of 
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March was by emphasizing the unprecedented expansion of university as an achievement, while 
minimizing the negative consequences of the uncontrolled growth.  Aslam Fazlija stated,  
“Our students…know that within only ten years and with extraordinary efforts by 
our society, according to the needs of the overall development of Kosovo and the 
enrichment of national equality, we developed a university with so many faculty 
and students that it now belongs amid the three largest universities in the country 
and which offers instruction in the mother tongue of the students; so quick, ample, 
and efficient an expansion is not noted in the history of the university.”365  
 
With this statement Fazlija implicitly acknowledged issues existed with the conditions at the 
university, but deflected those issues by emphasizing the community’s understanding of the 
complexities that accompanied the rapid growth of the university.  
Using the highest level of approbation,366 “admiration,” Yugoslav authorities, via Borba, 
espoused a consistent theme of “success” by workers, university personnel, students, youth, 
Albanians, and the other nations and nationalities of the region in halting protest actions. These 
pronouncements of success were offered without further negative or positive qualification.  
Although high in approbation, instances of “support” are less face saving than those of 
“admiration.” “Support” statements, which Yugoslav authorities also utilized in Borba, offer 
approval “of certain aspects of the other’s performance despite a certain problem.”367 For 
Yugoslav authorities, the problem they faced was the reality that the University of Prishtina had 
grown well beyond its capacity, thus contributing to the conditions that precipitated the initial 
demonstrations. The Yugoslav authorities acknowledged this; however, they emphasized that 
these problems were side effects of the popularity, growth, and excellence of the university that 
they had created. With this depiction of the situation, the Yugoslav officials presented the 
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qualifier of “support” and appreciation of the students for the creation and expansion of the 
university. 
4.5.4. Autonomy Face 
 
Unlike the RPSSh, the SFRJ did not vocalize expressions of autonomy face through the 
press to justify their freedom of action in the Kosovar demonstrations, which was for good 
reason.  Emphasizing their autonomy in dealing with the protests would be tantamount to 
admitting that they felt pressured internally or externally to modify tactics or change course in 
the way they were handling the situation. Though they surely did feel that pressure at multiple 
levels, admitting it would have projected a level of weakness that the Yugoslav regime could ill 
afford to acknowledge at that juncture in the post-Tito world. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
As Robyn Penman surmised, the concepts of facework “are features that concern identity 
and relationships.”368 The relationships that have been recounted in the previous chapter have 
distinct features. For the Albanian press and leadership, it was important to emphasize a 
relationship that was non-adversarial and fraternal to the peoples of Yugoslavia. It allowed them 
to express a face want that sought a strong personal connection of friendship, bound in past 
cooperation in the face of aggression and committed to providing assistance in the future. This 
did not, however, include the leadership of the state, who were clearly excluded as aggressors in 
the vein of pre-war nationalists and World War II-era fascist extremists.   
In projecting this face to audiences within Albania, Yugoslavia, and around the world, 
Albania presented a common identity of its state and the Albanian people, regardless of 
geographic location, as non-nationalistic. It showed a people and country that wanted only 
justice and what was right for their co-nationals in Yugoslavia, who had experienced the 
injustice and suffering that all Albanians had felt throughout their shared history. It asserted that 
the Yugoslav leadership, who had painted their co-nationals as aggressive nationalists working 
toward the destruction of Yugoslavia through the protest movement, was actually the 
chauvinistic, extreme nationalist. In particular, it was the nationalistic policies and practices of 
the SFRJ, not the Albanians or the Albanian state, that created the conditions for revolt.   
 The leadership of Yugoslavia and Borba expressed an identity of a state that was unified 
in its condemnation of the demonstrations. Yugoslavia’s citizens of all nations and nationalities 
were presented as professing the same attitude as the state toward the protests; furthermore, it 
stressed that the citizenry expressed support for the regime’s policies and practices and was                                                         
368 Robyn Penman, “Facework in Communication: Conceptual and Moral Challenges,” in The Challenge of 
Facework: Cross-Cultural and Interpersonal Issues, ed. Stella Ting-Toomey (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1994), 17. 
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offering cooperation in successfully putting down the uprising. Yugoslav officials painted 
themselves as realists that acknowledged the economic sufferings of their peoples and the less-
than-ideal conditions present at the University of Prishtina, but emphasized a communal 
cooperative spirit: the people and their government were working together to improve the 
situation.   
 In regard to the protestors, the Yugoslav leadership through Borba presented them as a 
group of Albanian-nationalist criminals, who were either foreign or under the influence of 
foreign groups. By projecting these images to audiences within and outside of Yugoslavia, it 
pinned guilt for the demonstrations on an outside party and expressed the solidarity and like-
mindedness of all patriotic Yugoslavs. It showed that it was not their people that were protesting 
against them, but foreign elements that were working toward the destruction of the state. Most 
importantly, though, the Yugoslav leaders clearly pronounced that they were competently 
handling the problems of the country successfully, and that they still enjoyed the support of the 
nations and nationalities of the federation in the post-Tito era. 
The 1981 Kosovar Uprising represented a watershed moment in the history of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the death of Josip Broz Tito, it showed that 
the systems put in place to carry Yugoslavia forward without his leadership were lacking. The 
creation of a semi-confederal structure, within which the constituent republics and autonomous 
provinces were treated as quasi-nation states, could not satisfy the needs of the nations and 
nationalities. For SAP Kosovo, economic issues coalesced with the lack of true equality within 
the SFRJ to create an untenable situation for many Kosovar Albanians. Using Rogers Brubaker’s 
vocabulary, a triadic relational nexus between nationalizing state, an external national homeland, 
and a national minority had come together within a period of uncertainty and stress to erupt into 
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nationess as an event. Although many observers at the time, including Dennison Rusinow, 
believed that the “nationalistic excesses” within Yugoslavia were banal in nature and did not 
signal the onset of a period of perpetual crises leading to the end of the Federation,369 what came 
to be true was that future contingent events, again shrouded in increasing economic distress and 
international upheaval, lead to the disintegration of the multinational republic.  
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Ramet (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 132. 
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